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Case No. 20080183-SC
IN THE

UTAH UTAH SUPREME COURT

State of Utah,
Respondent/Appellee,
vs.

Francisco A. Candedo,
Candedo/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals and has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3) (a), -(5) (West Supp. 2008).1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. "Whether the court of appeals erred in holding Candedo's due process arguments
could not be raised under rule 22 (e) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure." Order of July 11,
2008 (Addendum A).
2. "Whether the court of appeals erred in holding exceptional circumstances did not
justify treatment of Candedo's due process arguments on the merits." Order of July 11,2008
(Addendum A).

Citation in this brief is to the current West code, unless otherwise indicated.

Standards ofReview. Both issues present questions of law. "On certiorari, we review
the court of appeals' decision for correctness, giving its conclusions of law no deference."
State v. Bujan, 2008 UT 47, % 7,190 P.3d 1255 (citation omitted)
3. Whether the imposition of a nine-year probationary term violated Candedo's right
to due process." Order of July 11, 2008 (Addendum A).
Standard of Review. To determine whether the nine-year probationary term violated
Candedo's right to due process, the Court must consider the constitutionality of Utah's
probation statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2008). "A constitutional
challenge to a statute presents a question of law, which [the Court] review[s] for
correctness." State v. Alinas,, 2007 UT 83, If 7, 171 P-3d 1046 (citation omitted). "When
addressing such a challenge, this court presumes that the statute is valid, and resolve[s] any
reasonable doubt in favor of constitutionality." Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are attached at Addendum
B:
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (West 2004);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201, -201.1 (West Supp. 2008; West 2004);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) (Michie 1993);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (West Supp. 2008);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1 (West 2004);
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-37-1 to -3 (West 2004; West Supp. 2008);
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-38a-302, - 501 (West Supp. 2008; West 2004).
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Candedo was charged by information with four counts of securities fraud and one
count of pattern of unlawful activity (racketeering), all second degree felonies, and one count
each of securities fraud, sales by an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent, and employing an
unlicensed broker-dealer or agent, all third degree felonies. R7-16.
Candedo pled guilty to one count each of second-degree-felony securitiesfraud,thirddegree-felony sales by an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent, and third-degree-felony
employing an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent. R207-09,219. Candedo agreed to pay full
restitution—"to all the victims in the case . . . ,"in the approximate amount #£23 million
dollars—and that if placed on probation, he "will make monthly payments toward restitution
. . . ." R219. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss all remaining charges and to
recommend probation. R219.
The court sentenced Candedo to concurrent prison terms of one-to-fifteen years for
securities fraud, and zero-to-five years on his two third-degree-felony convictions. R244-45;
270:16-26, 34-35. But the court suspended the prison terms on all three counts, instead
imposing a 365-day jail term and placing Candedo "on probation for 108 month(s)."
R270:35; R245-46. In response to Candedo's inquiry about whether the court had the
authority to issue that probationary term, the court answered, "I can give 36 months on each
of [the] three felonies he's convicted of." Id. at 270:35. The court also ordered that Candedo
pay full restitution in an agreed-upon amount or an amount to be determined at a hearing.
R270:35; R246. The court explained that "the most fair thing to do with [Candedo] is to
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have him serve some time, and then to work for a long time paying as much money back as
humanly possible" R270:34. The court further explained that the nine-year term was based
on "the amount of money that you've got to pay back." R270:35.
Candedo did not ask the trial court to correct his allegedly illegal sentence. He first
challenged his probationary term on appeal. See State v. Candedo, 2008 UT App 4, 176
P.3d 459 (copy attached at Addendum C). He claimed for the first time that "the probation
statute, as interpreted by Wallace violate[d] his due process rights under the Utah and U.S.
constitutions." Id \5. See State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, If 16,150 P.3d 540 (holding 144month probationary term "does not constitute an illegal sentence").
The court of appeals declined to review the merits of Candedo's unpreserved due
process claim, holding that it did not meet the requirements of either rule 22(e), Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure or the exceptional circumstances doctrine. Id. ^fl[ 6-9.
This Court granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
From June 2001 through June 2002, persons acting under Candedo's and Nia Cano's
direction, "directly or indirectly collected millions of dollars from hundreds of investors for
and investment in MBU [Mutual Benefits Union Corporation] through ABC [Alternate
Business Capital]." R23. The Utah Division of Securities deemed MBU's offerings to be
nonexempt securities, determined that Candedo, Cano, and those acting under them had
never been licensed to sell securities in Utah, and that Candedo and Cano, directly or
indirectly, made multiple material misrepresentations and omissions. R27-29, 42.
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As early as December 2001, investors were demanding funds from MBU, but were
unable to recover their investments. R26. By January 2003, the corporate status of MBU, a
Nevada corporation, was "delinquent, inactive and revoked." R21.
The presentence investigation report (PSI at R265) stated that the MBU/ABC
investment businesses constituted a "pyramid scheme" by which Candedo "defraud[ed]"
over a hundred Utah victims out of millions of dollars. R265:2. Candedo continued to do
business even after lawsuits were filed and a Utah cease and desist order and California
injunctions were issued. R265:3.
The PSI noted that Candedo's claim that he did not know the business founder was
"bilking the investors," or that the company was a pyramid scheme, "simply does not ring
true." Id.
Candedo's fraudulent actions devastated many of his victims. R265:13-17. Some
lost retirements funds. R265:3 Others lost their homes and properties. Id. Still others lost
their businesses and their credit ratings. Id. Several, elderly or ill, lost their ability to live
independently and became dependent on family members to support them. Id. One victim
attempted suicide. Id. Other victims' marriages and relationships with family members and
friends whom they "brought into" the investment scheme were jeopardized. Id. Another
victim lost 1.1 million dollars, the majority of which he gave directly to Candedo. R265:13.
According to that victim, Candedo's fraudulent actions left him unemployed, bankrupt, and
so severely depressed that he had attempted suicide. Id. Yet another victim, a 70-year-old
woman with cancer, lost her home. R265:16.
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Candedo expressed little empathy for his victims: "[Candedo] has stated that he
deeply regrets his 'part in the financial loss of the ABC members/ but that is the extent of
expressed concern for the victims in this case." R265:3. The LSI (Level of Service
Inventory), an assessment tool designed to assess and prioritize offender needs, revealed one
of Candedo's greatest needs involved "attitude/orientation." R265:2. The PSI stated:
"[This] area reflects [Candedo]'s minimization of his role in ABC and related businesses, his
failure to accept his measure of responsibility for the victimization of the investors he
recruited into the 'program' and perceived lack of victim empathy." Id.
The Utah Attorney General's Office compiled a list of 146 victims. R265:12; see
Victim Restitution List, at R265. That office computed restitution to be $3,373,060.
R265:3. AP&P recommended that Candedo be incarcerated at the Utah State Prison for the
terms prescribed by law on each count, pay restitution, surrender his passport, and have no
contact with Cano or other co-defendants. R265:l-2.
At sentencing, the court heard from Utah victims and their representatives. R270:2-1.
Their testimony corroborated the PSI's assessment of Candedo's lack of empathy and
cooperation. R265:2, 17-25.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant may move the
court to correct an illegal sentence at any time. Because of the rule's broad temporal sweep,
rule 22(e) claims must be carefully circumscribed to prevent abuse by the reviewing court:

6

Thus, the challenged sentence must be "patently" or "manifestly" illegal to qualify for rule
22(e) review.
Without ever mentioning these critical watch-phrases, Candedo argues that the court
of appeals too-narrowly regarded the scope of rule 22(e) review in refusing to review his
unpreserved due process challenge to the probation statute. He relies on case law that
collectively describes claims which have been reviewed under rule 22(e), and suggests that
his due process claim is equally deserving. Each of those cases, however, involves a
sentence that is patently or manifestly illegal by virtue of its direct conflict with the express
language- of an existing statute, rule, constitutional provision, or decision. That is not the
case here, where the type of probationary term imposed has expressly been held to be legal.
Candedo has cited n controlling authority that a statute that authorizes the imposition of the
probationary term imposed here violates due process.
II. The court of appeals also did not err in refusing to address Candedo's unpreserved
due process claim under the exceptional circumstances doctrine. Exceptional circumstances
is a concept that is used sparingly and properly reserved for truly exceptional situations:
cases involving rare procedural anomalies. That is not the case here.
Candedo argues that because, at the time he was sentenced, existing court of appeals'
case law apparently recognized specific time limits to a probationary term and because this
Court's decision in Wallace, clarifying that case law, had not issued, he had no warning that
he needed to argue that the probation statute violated substantive due process.
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The court of appeals correctly recognized that its earlier cases mentioned probationary
time periods only in dicta. Moreover, one of cases specifically suggested the possibility that
the imposition of consecutive probationary terms might be legal—the very outcome Candedo
sought to avoid. Thus, Candedo had the "warning" he claims was necessary to trigger a due
process claim.
Furthermore, the issuance of this Court's decision in Wallace, after Candedo was
sentenced, did not prevent him from raising his due process claim in the trial court. The
court of appeals correctly observed that Candedo's due process argument was as available to
him in the trial court as the statutory argument he did rely on, regardless of when Wallace
issued.
Last, the authorities Candedo relies on are inapposite to this case

One of those

authorities reached a new claim under the exceptional circumstances doctrine because there
the delay in advancing the new claim was procedurally justified—by having prevailed on a
different theory in the trial court, the defendant had no need to advance a new claim. Here,
by contrast, Candedo had "lost" in the trial court, and thus had immediate warning to
advance whatever claims were available. The other authority held that it would be
manifestly unjust to allow a conviction to stand for an offense recently held not to exist.
That authority is not analogous where Candedo's sentence in this case was recently held to
be legal, not manifestly illegal.
III. The imposition of a nine-year probationary term did not violate Candedo's right to
substantive due process. Candedo essentially argues that because the sole goal of probation

8

is rehabilitation of the offender, which will generally be achieved, if at all, within five years,
supervised probation beyond that prospective point of rehabilitation infringes his due process
rights. Candedo's argument fails, as a threshold matter, because he mistakenly assumes that
he will be on probation for longer than is necessary to rehabilitate him. Under Utah's
probation statute, the trial court retains jurisdiction and discretion to terminate probation
when appropriate. Thus, the probation statute provides all the due process Candedo asserts
he is entitled to.
In any case, to establish a due process violation, Candedo must show that the asserted
right implicates a "fundamental liberty interest," one which is"deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition,"... and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither
liberty nor justice would exist if [it was] sacrificed." Barring such a showing, Candedo must
show that the asserted infringement on a liberty interest is not rationally related to a
legitimate government objective.
At the outset, Candedo has not identified any liberty interest implicating substantive
due process. A felony offender is not entitled to probation, and, accordingly, even when
probation is granted it may be burdened to substantially the same extent that a prisoner's
liberty may be burdened. Therefore, Candedo's asserted liberty interest—the right to have
his probation terminated after the period of his prospective probation has passed—is no right
at all.
Even assuming the existence of a right, Candedo's asserted liberty interest is not
"fundamental." The very exclusive list of rights held to be "fundamental" includes those
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rights set out in the Bill of Rights and a very few others—like the right to marry, to be free of
physical restraint, to have children—that identify the most intimate relationships in human
existence. The asserted right plainly does not belong in that category. The relatively brief
history of probation shows that the asserted right is neither deeply rooted in the nation's
history and tradition, nor implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty
nor justice would exist if it was sacrificed. . In fact, the asserted interest is merely a
possibility, the outcome of possible rehabilitation being purely prospective. And Candedo
cannot cite any authority that discusses, much less supports, his novel claim.
The nine-year probationary term and the probation statute, which imposes no statutory
time limitation on probation, are rationally related to the legitimate legislative objective of
rehabilitating offenders and maximizing the payment of restitution, a statutorily-authorized
goal of probation. Contrary to Candedo's arguments, a large number of states have enacted
statutes variously granting the trial court unlimited discretion in determining the length of
probation, fixing probation not to exceed the maximum sentence, or setting the probationary
limit at a large number of years. These states, nevertheless, by statute and case law,
acknowledge the primary significance of rehabilitation in probation. Utah is no exception.
Apart from any concern about the effect of rehabilitation, the nine-year term imposed
in this case was rationally related to the legitimate legislative goal of maximizing payment of
restitution to victims. Like virtually every other state, Utah has statutorily sought to protect
victims by authorizing the payment of restitution to victims as a condition of probation.
Utah statutes, as a whole, clearly show that the protection of victims through the payment of
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restitution is a compelling state interest. Authority shows that maximum restitution is
frequently accomplished when the probationer is under threat of having his probation
revoked. Thus, there exists a rational relationship between the nine-year probationary term
and the objective of ensuring that offenders make good on their restitution obligations.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
CANDEDO'S UNPRESERVED DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT
COULD NOT BE RAISED UNDER RULE 22(E) OF THE RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Candedo, conceding that his claim was not preserved in the trial court, argues that the
court of appeals erred in holding that his due process challenge to the probation statute was
not reviewable as an illegal sentence under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Petr. Br. at 31-35. On the contrary, the court of appeals correctly recognized that because
Candedo's statutorily authorized 108-month probationary term was not a "patently" or
"manifestly illegal sentence," his unpreserved claim did not qualify for review under rule
22(e). Candedo, 2008 UT App 4, \ 6.
A.

Only patently or manifestly illegal sentences are reviewable under rule
22(e).
Under rule 22(e), "[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed

in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). Accordingly, "rule 22(e) claims
are not restricted by the time limits for bringing notice of appeal," . . . "or waived by failure
to raise them at the first opportunity before the district court." State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51,
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f 5, 48 P.3d 228 (per curiam). "For this reason, rule 22(e) claims must be carefully
circumscribed to prevent abuse." Id.
To prevent the potential for abuse unlocked by the broad temporal sweep of rule
22(e), Utah's appellate court's have repeatedly stated that the rule applies only to "patently"
or "manifestly illegal" sentences. Telford, 2002 UT 51, f 5 ("The purpose of rule 22(e) is to
allow correction of manifestly illegal sentences."); State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah
1995) ("When a sentence is patently illegal, an appellate court can vacate the illegal sentence
. . . even if the matter was never raised before."); State v. Garner, 2008 UT App 32, \ 17,
177 P.3d 637 ("[A]n illegal sentence reviewable under rule 22(e) 'is a "patently" illegal
sentence, or a manifestly illegal sentence."'") (quoting State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9,
1115, 84 P.3d 854) (quoting Telford, 2002 UT 5 \,\ 5); State v. McGuire, 2005 UT App 13U
("An illegal sentence under rule 22(e) must be 'patently' or 'manifestly' illegal.") (per
curiam) (memorandum decision) (citation omitted). "Patently," means "obvious[ly]";
"manifestly," means "plainly, obviously." Webster's Third New International Dictionary
1654, 1375 (1993).
B.

The court of appeals correctly recognized that because the
probationary provision of section 77-18-1 was not patently or
manifestly illegal, Candedo's unpreserved due process challenge to the
provision was not reviewable under rule 22(e).
Here, the court of appeals refused to consider Candedo's unpreserved due process

challenge to the probation statute, recognizing that "rule 22(e) only applies to a '"patently"'
or '"manifestly" illegal sentence

'" Candedo, 2008 UT App 4, <|| 6 (quoting Thorkelson,

2004 UT App 9, f 15, quoting Brooks, 908 P.2d at 860) (citing Telford, 2002 UT 51, ^ 5).
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The court of appeals noted that this Court had "defined [patently or manifestly illegal
sentences] as occurring where either 'the sentencing court has no jurisdiction, or . . . the
sentence is beyond the authorized statutory range." Id. (quoting Thorkelson, 2004 UT App
9,115, citing Telford, 2002 UT 51, *{ 5 n. 1). The court of appeals observed that the trial
court's jurisdiction was not disputed. Id. It also observed that "in light of the supreme
court's statutory interpretation of the [probationary provision of] [Utah Code Ann.] section
77-18-l(10)(a)(i) [(West Supp. 2008),] and its holding that a'twelve-year probation does not
constitute an illegal sentence,'... Candedo's nine-year probation is not an illegal sentence."
Id. (quoting Wallace, 2006 UT 86 , 1f 16). See Wallace, 2006 UT 86,ffif7-15 (holding that
the language of section 77-1-18(10(a)(i)— "[probation may be terminated at any time at the
discretion of the court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation"—
authorized imposition of a probationary term in excess of 36 months). "Therefore," the court
of appeals held, "Candedo's claim that his sentence violates his due process rights is not
reviewable under rule 22(e)." Id.
Candedo argues that the court of appeals incorrectly refused to consider his due
process claim because it mistakenly understood review under rule 22(e) to address only
jurisdictional defects or sentences beyond their authorized statutory range. Petr. Br. at 3132. Asserting that "the language of rule 22(e) is 'sweeping,'" he argues that review under
rule 22(e) properly reaches claims of constitutional and rule-based sentencing violations.
Petr. Br. at 33-34 (citing cases).
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Candedo's argument is misleading in that it deflects review of the threshold question
under rule 22(e): whether the challenged sentence is patently or manifestly illegal. Candedo
first attempts to circumvent that issue by neglecting to mention that, under rule 22(e), review
is limited to patently or manifestly illegal sentences. See e.g.,Telford, 2002 UT 51, % 5;
Brooks, 908 P.2d at 860; State v. Garner, 2008 UT App 32, ^ 17, Thorkelson, 2004 UT App
9, U 15; McGuire, 2005 UT App 13.
His assertion, that "the language of rule 22(e) is 'sweeping," is also misleading in that
it suggests that review under rule 22(e), by its terms, embraces a broad variety of challenges
to sentences, including his own, when, in fact, it does not. See Petr. Br. at 33 & 34 (citing
Brooks, 908 P.2d at 860). In Brooks, this Court used the term "sweeping" to refer only to the
broad temporal reach of rule 22(e). 908 P.2d at 860 (holding that "[w]hen a sentence is
patently illegal," [either a trial or] an appellate court can vacate the illegal sentence... "even
if the matter was never raised before . . . because an illegal sentence is void and, like issues
ofjurisdiction, should be raisable at any time"). Thus, while the timing for review under rule
22(e) might be "sweeping," review under rule 22(e) cannot be "sweeping," for that would
contravene the proscription that "rule 22(e) claims must be carefully circumscribed to
prevent abuse." See Telford, 2002 UT 51, \ 5.
In accord with that stricture, every case Candedo cites, in arguing that the court of
appeals here too-narrowly regarded the scope of rule 22(e) review, see Petr. Br. at 33-35,
involves a sentence that is patently or manifestly illegal by virtue of its direct conflict with
the express language of an existing statute, rule, constitutional provision, or decision. In
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Telford, the trial court denied Telford's motion to correct his sentence under rule 22(e).
2002 UT 51, If 2. On appeal to this Court, Telford argued that Utah's indeterminate
sentencing scheme violated article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution (separation of
powers). This Court disposed of that claim in a single sentence, observing that the Court had
"already addressed and rejected [that] contention . . . ." Id. ^ 3 (citing Padilla v. Bd. of
Pardons, 947 P.2d 664, 668-69 (Utah 1997)). Telford further claimed that indeterminate
sentencing contravened the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and article
I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution Id.% 2.This Court rejected that claim in two sentences,
holding that under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999), accomplices were subject to the same
level of offense as their principals. Id. \ 4. Under the watch phrase—"[t]he purpose of rule
22(e) is to allow correction of manifestly illegal sentences"—the Court gave short shrift to
the balance of Telford's state and federal constitutional claims because they either did not
entail sentencing issues or were masked attacks on his conviction. Id. ffl[ 5-8 (citation
omitted).
In Kuehnert v. Turner, the trial court sentenced Kuehnert without his counsel present
and without notice of his right to counsel. 499 P.2d 839, 839-40 (Utah 1972). This Court
held, without reference to any predecessor to rule 22(e), that Kuehnert's sentence was
illegal, relying on article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution: "In criminal prosecutions
the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel...." Id. at
840-41. See also State v. Headley, 2002 UT 58U (memorandum decision) (addressing claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, in light of Kuehnert, but readily rejecting
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claim for lack of record evidence); Headley, 2002 UT 58U (Greenwood, J., concurring in
result) (opining that "claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and erroneous fact findings
by the sentencing judge are simply not cognizable under rule 22(e)/' and noting that "[t]he
sentence imposed was permissible under applicable statutes").
In State v. Higginbotham, the trial court enhanced Higginbotham's five-to-life
sentence for aggravated robbery with a consecutive two-year term under the gun
enhancement. 917 P.2d 545, 551 (Utah 1996). This Court held that under then-existing case
law, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) (1993) "[did] not authorize a consecutive, determinate
two-year term," and thus the sentence was illegal. Id. (citing State v. Cobb, 11A P.2d 1123,
1129 (Utah 1989)).
In State v. Garner, Garner was convicted of three counts of aggravated sexual assault,
an offense punishable by an indeterminate prison term of six, ten, or fifteen years to life.
2008 UT App 32, ^ 4 177 P.3d 637, cert, denied, 189 P.3d 1276 (Utah 2008). Garner
claimed for the first time on appeal that Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme violated his
Sixth Amendment rights because it permitted a judge to make factual findings to elevate his
minimum sentence above the presumptive middle term to the higher term contemplated by
statute. Id. f 21. Based on the Sixth Amendment "right to . . . trial... by an impartial jury,"
and a series of United States Supreme Court cases, which unambiguously held that judicial
fact-finding may never permissibly elevate the minimum term beyond the maximum
statutory range, the court of appeals rejected Gamer's rule 22(e) challenge. Id. ffif 21-24
(citations omitted).
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State v. Samora, 2004 UT 79,fflf3-4, 99 P.3d 858, on which Candedo also relies, is
not truly relevant to this case because the rule 22(e) analysis was based not on the imposition
of an illegal sentence, but on a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. 2004 UT 79, ^f 13,99
P.3d 858. Candedo does not claim that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner. In
any case, the illegality in that case was also manifest. There, the trial court sentenced
Samora in absentia without determining whether his absence was voluntary or according him
his rights under rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at ^f 3-4,99. On certiorari
review, this Court held that "a sentence imposed in violation of rule 22(a) . . . may be
considered a 'sentence imposed in an illegal manner' under rule 22(e)." Id. ^f 13. Notably,
rule 22(a) requires that at sentencing a defendant be allowed to allocute, to present any
mitigating evidence, and to show why sentence should not be imposed.
In sum, Utah's appellate courts have undertaken review under rule 22(e) only when
existing law provided an explicit, clearly defined basis to hold the sentence patently or
manifestly illegal. That is not the case here
Candedo claims the probation statute—section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i)—violates due
process because it permits a trial court to impose a probationary term beyond a period he
conceives as limited to only serving a probationer's rehabilitative needs. Petr. Br. at 7-31.
Nowhere does Candedo offer any statute, rule, constitutional provision or case stating that a
statute that authorizes the imposition of a probationary term as in this case violates due
process. Quite the opposite. As this Court stated in Wallace, "the Utah Code imposes no
statutory time limitation on probation and [a] twelve-year probation does not constitute an
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illegal sentence." 2006 UT 86, ^f 16. In short, because the probationary term imposed in this
case is not patently or manifestly illegal, it is not reviewable under rule 22(e).
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES DOES NOT JUSTIFY
TREATMENT OF CANDEDO'S UNPRESERVED DUE PROCESS
ARGUMENTS
Candedo, conceding that his claim was not preserved in the trial court, argues that
"the court of appeals erred when it held that exceptional circumstances did not justify
reaching [his] due process argument." Petr. Br. at 35. He specifically argues that because
court of appeals' case law recognized specific monthly limits to a probationary term at the
time he was sentenced, and because this Court's decision in Wallace had not issued before he
was sentenced, "[he] had no warning that he needed to argue the probation statute violated
substantive due process." Petr. Br. at 37. But, as the court of appeals recognized, neither the
law nor the facts of this case justifies reviewing Candedo's due process claim under the
exceptional circumstances doctrine.
"Under ordinary circumstances, we will not consider an issue brought for the first
time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or exceptional circumstances
exist." State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, \ 16, 94 P.3d 186. "'[Exceptional
circumstances' is a concept that is used sparingly, properly reserved for truly exceptional
situations, for cases . . . involving 'rare procedural anomalies.'" State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5,
11 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n. 3 (Utah 1993)). The
exceptional circumstances doctrine is "reservfed] for the most unusual circumstances where
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our failure to consider an issue that was not properly preserved for appeal would have
resulted in manifest injustice." Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, \ 23.
Candedo argues that on the date he was sentenced, September 12, 2005 (R270:l),
"Utah case law interpreted the probation statute as imposing a 36-month limit on probation."
Petr. Br. at 37 (citing State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah App. 1993) (noting that
"the maximum formal probation periods for . . . a class A misdemeanor [is] thirty-six
months"); State v. McDonald, 2005UTApp 86, % 19,110P.3d 149 ("The probationary term
for a class C misdemeanor may not exceed twelve months pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7718-l(10)(a)(i)."),c^. denied, 124P.3d251 (Utah2005)). Nor, he argues, had this Court's
decision in Wallace issued. Id. Accordingly, "[he] had no warning that he needed to argue
the probation statute violated substantive due process." Id.
In Wallace, very much as in this case, the trial court suspended Wallace's prison
sentences and placed him on twelve years probation for six felony convictions related to his
participation in an investment scheme in which he defrauded several homeowners of more
than half a million dollars. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, Tffl 1-2. Before the court of appeals,
Wallace challenged the legality of his twelve-y ear probationary term. Id. at f 6. He argued
there, as he did before this Court on certiorari review, that "section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) limits
probation to a maximum of thirty-six months for one or more felony convictions and that his
144-month probation therefore constitutes an illegal sentence under Utah law." Id.
This Court rejected that claim on the language of the probation statute. Id. at «|ffl 7-16.
Section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) provides: "Probation may be terminated at any time at the
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discretion of the court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases. . . . " [Emphasis added.] The Court observed that
prior to 1989 the predecessor to section 77-18-1 (10)(a)(i) read: "Upon completion without
violation of 18 months' probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases,... the probation
period shall be terminated, unless earlier terminated by the court." Wallace, 2006 UT 86, f
11 (emphasis in original). "In its next legislative session, however, the Legislature modified
the statute to its current form, substituting "may" for "shall." Id. "As a consequence," this
Court held, "we read the statute as it is written: a court may terminate probation for a felony
at thirty-six months, or it may terminate probation at any other time." Id. at •ft 13 (emphasis
in original). Accordingly, the Court upheld the imposition of the 144-month probationary
term. Id. at If 15.
Here, the court of appeals correctly recognized that Candedo presented almost the
identical claim that this court rejected in Wallace. Candedo, 2008 UT App 4, Y! 1-4
(rejecting claim that 108-month probationary term was composed of three consecutive thirtysix month terms in violation of section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i)). The court observed that neither
the language ofRobinson ox McDonald, nor the timing of this Court's issuance of Wallace,
presented a "rare procedural anomaly" to justify review of Candedo's unpreserved claim. It
first recognized that neither Robinson nor McDonald authoritatively spoke to the length of
the statutory probationary period in a manner Candedo could have relied on. Candedo, 2008
UT App 4, f 7 ("'We are not bound by cases which, in dicta, assume without deciding that
Utah Code section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) creates maximum probationary periods."') (quoting
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State v. Wallace, 2005 UT App 434,f 18 n. 10, 124 P.3d 259, affd, 2006 UT 86, 150 P.3d
540); cf. State v. Orr,, 2005 UT 92, ^ 23, 127 P.3d 1213 (observing that statement in prior
case that law was "in accord" with due process requirements did "not demonstrate that such
requirement was the minimum mandated by due process") (emphasis added). Thus,
Robinson and McDonald could not have assured Candedo that the imposition of a
probationary term exceeding thirty-six months was beyond the realm of possibility. In fact,
McDonald invited just such a possibility: "If consecutive terms of probation for multiple
convictions are permissible, a question that we do not reach today, the sentencing court must
clearly determine the probation period for each offense and explicitly state that the terms are
to run consecutively." McDonald,2005 UT App 86, f 21 (emphasis added). Thus,
McDonald clearly provided notice that consecutive probationary terms might legitimately be
imposed, the condition that Candedo implicitly acknowledges defeats review under the
exceptional circumstances doctrine.
Notwithstanding McDonald, defendant argues that the circumstances in this case are
like those in State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), in which this Court did resort to the
exceptional circumstances doctrine. Petr. Br. at 35-36. Lopez moved to suppress evidence
found in a traffic stop. 873 P.2d at 1130. He argued that the stop was a pretext, relying only
on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 1130,1134 n.2. The trial
court granted Lopez's motion, and the court of appeals upheld that ruling on interlocutory
appeal. Id. at 1129-30. The State sought certiorari challenging the Fourth Amendment
pretext doctrine. Id. at 1134 n.2. Lopez cross-petitioned, claiming that if the Fourth
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Amendment did not outlaw a pretext stop, then article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution
should. Id. at 1127, 1134 n.2. On certiorari review, this Court rejected pretext analysis
under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1140. However, the Court considered Lopez's
alternative state constitutional challenge, raised for the first time on review, under the
exceptional circumstances doctrine. Id. The Court reasoned that, having prevailed in the
trial court and before the court of appeals under the Fourth Amendment, Lopez had no
reason to earlier know that the Fourth Amendment underpinnings of pretext doctrine would
be attacked and thereby invoke a state constitutional claim. Id. at 1134 n.2.
The circumstances in this case are very different from those in Lopez. Lopez had no
need to earlier make a new argument because he had prevailed in the trial court. In this case,
Candedo had, in his view, "lost" in the trial court when the court imposed a probationary
term exceeding thirty-six months. Thus, unlike Lopez, Candedo was, again, immediately on
notice to make any arguments available to him at that time, including the claim that his due
process rights had been violated. See Candedo, 2008 UT App 4, ^f 8, f 8 n.5 (distinguishing
Lopez, and observing "the fact that the trial court imposed such a long period of probation—
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after disagreeing with Candedo's assertion that it did not have the authority to do so—should
have put Candedo on notice that his due process rights were arguably implicated").
Furthermore, Candedo does not even address the court ofappeals' principal basis for
refusing to consider his due process claim under the exceptional circumstances doctrine: the
issuance of this Court's decision in Wallace after Candedo was sentenced was irrelevant to
Candedo's failure to timely raise his constitutional claim in the trial court. Id. at \ 8. The
court of appeals persuasively noted that
the constitutional limitations of probation terms were not addressed in Wallace
or either of the two cases Candedo cites in support of his exceptional
2

Candedo also relies on State v. Hasten, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993). Petr. Br. at 36.
There, the court of appeals refused to consider a claim first raised on appeal, that the crime of
attempted depraved indifference murder did not exist in Utah. Id. at 1277. This Court,
having recently determined that such a crime did not exist, held that it would be "manifestly
unjust" not to consider the assigned error and reversed. Id. But see State v. Archambeau,
820 P.2d 920, 925 (Utah App. 1991) ("The fact that a 'liberty interest' is at stake is merely
one factor articulated by the court to be considered when determining whether 'exceptional
circumstances' exist.")
Haston is inapposite to this case. The Haston Court made no express mention of the
exceptional circumstances doctrine as a basis for review. Id. at 1277. Rather, it appears to
have reversed under the formal rules of retroactivity. See State v. Menzies 889 P.2d 393,
407 (Utah 1994) ("In [State v.] Norton, [675 P.2d 577, 583 (Utah 1983), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1986)] we recognized that 'when this
Court established a new rule of law on an essential element of a crime, a criminal defendant
whose direct appeal was pending was entitled to the benefit of the new rule for the resolution
of his appeal.'") Even assuming that this Court implicitly relied on the exceptional
circumstances doctrine, this case is very different from Haston. As discussed at Pt. I, the
lengthy probationary term imposed in this case is not manifestly illegal. Indeed, unlike the
error in Haston, not only has the term imposed in this case not been held to be illegal, it has
expressly been held to be legal. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, ^f 16. Thus, this Court's refusal to
review Candedo's due process claim would not be "manifestly unjust." Haston, 846 P.2d at
1277. Further, somewhat like Lopez, Haston sought to avail himself of a rule that benefited
him; that is, he would prevail under the new rule. Here, by contrast, Candedo would not
prevail; rather, he loses under Wallace.
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circumstances argument. Even if Candedo reasonably believed that he could
later appeal the sentence under rule 22(e), he could have asserted his due
process claim as well. We will not expand the exceptional circumstances
exception to include Candedo's situation as it does not rise to the level of a
"rare procedural anomal[y]."
Candedo, 2008 UT App 4,^9

(citations omitted).

Like the court of appeals, this Court has already rejected a similar "no-warning" claim
in State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994). Lopez was tried for sex crimes against a child.
On appeal, he argued that a photo array was impermissibly suggestive under state due
process principles announced in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). Lopez, 886
P.2d at 1113. At trial, Lopez did not object on this ground, as Ramirez had not yet been
decided. Id. On appeal, this Court had to "determine whether Lopez may now raise that
issue on appeal." Id. The court held that "Lopez cannot raise the issue of state due process
for the first time on appeal because he has not demonstrated that the 'plain error' or
'exceptional circumstances' exceptions exist." Id.
In sum, that Candedo did not receive the notice afforded by this Court's opinion in
Wallace (or the court of appeals' decision in Wallace, also issued after Candedo was
sentenced, see R270:1), does little to diminish the sufficiency of the notice he did receive at
his sentencing to make any available arguments. Accordingly, the court of appeals correctly
declined to review Candedo's unpreserved due process claim under the exceptional
circumstances doctrine. Moreover, if, as Candedo argues, the nine-year probationary term is
clearly offensive to his fundamental liberty interests, he had clear recourse at sentencing. As
the court of appeals recognized:
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We reiterate, however, this court's comment in State v. Wallace, 2005 UT App
434 . . . : "Defendant here did not have to accept the terms of his probation...
. [He] did not choose incarceration. He chose probation and thereby accepted
its terms. Having accepted its terms, he now must abide by them." Id. ^ 19
(citing State v. Allmendinger, 565 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Utah 1977)).
Candedo, 2008 UT App. 4,18 n.6.
If the Court determines that the court of appeals correctly refused to consider
Candedo's unpreserved substantive due process claim on the merits, either because the nineyear probationary term was not manifestly illegal under rule 22(e) or because the
circumstances did not constitute a "rare procedural anomaly" to justify review under the
exceptional circumstances doctrine, the Court need not reach the merits of Point III.
III.
THE IMPOSITION OF A NINE-YEAR PROBATIONARY TERM
DID NOT VIOLATE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Candedo claims that "the imposition of a nine-year probationary period violated [his]
right to due process." Petr. Br. at 7. The kernel of his substantive due process argument is
that because "the legislatively-stated purpose of probation is rehabilitation,"... which "'can
be accomplished, if at all, within five years[,]'". . . the nine-year probationary term
"undermines the rehabilitative goals of probation." Petr. Br. at 9-11,22 (citations omitted).
Therefore, he concludes, the probationary term infringes on a fundamental liberty interest—
"the right... to regain his liberty once the purposes of probation are complete." Petr. Br. at
25-31. Additionally, he argues, the extended term is not rationally related to advancing the
State's interest in rehabilitation, a goal even further frustrated in this case by the imposition
of a statutorily-prohibited probationary term to pay restitution.
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Petr. at 9-25.

Candedo's argument fails, as a threshold matter, because he mistakenly assumes that
he will be on probation for longer than is necessary to rehabilitate him. As explained below,
the fact that the trial court has imposed an initial probationary term of nine years does not
mean that he will be on probation for longer than is necessary to rehabilitate him. Under
Utah's probation statute, the trial court retains jurisdiction and discretion to terminate
probation when appropriate.
Candedo's argument fails, as a secondary matter, because he has not shown that he
has any right, let alone a fundamental right, to a specific term of probation.
A.

Candedo's substantive due process argument fails at the outset because
he mistakenly assumes that he will be on probation for longer than is
necessary to rehabilitate him.
Candedo's substantive due process argument is a roundabout attack on this Court's

interpretation of the probation statute in Wallace, wherein this Court held that the probation
statute imposes no limit on the probationary term that a trial court may impose. 2006 UT 86,
Tf 16. See Petr. Br. at 22. To effect this challenge, Candedo insists that the sole object of
probation is rehabilitation of the offender, which will be achieved, if at all, within five years.
Petr. Br. at 9-11. Therefore, he reasons, the initial imposition of a nine-year probationary
term infringes on a fundamental liberty interest— "the right... to regain his liberty once the
purposes of probation are complete." Petr. Br. at 25-31. Candedo is mistaken.
Section 77-18-1(10(a)(i) provides that probation "may be terminated at any time at the
discretion of the court

" Accordingly, Candedo can move the court before the expiration

of thirty-six months, or five years, or at any time he believes that he has been rehabilitated to
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have his probation terminated. In short, the probation statute provides all the due process he
asserts that he is entitled to, and this Court need not consider the merits of his claim.
B.

Candedo has not shown that he has any right, let alone a fundamental
right, to probation for a term less than necessary for him to pay full
restitution.
1. Established substantive due process analysis only rarely recognizes
an asserted liberty interest to be "fundamental," so as to require a
showing that the claimed infringement be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest
The federal Due Process Clause states: "No State shall... deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const, amend. XIV.3 In addition to
"fair process" and "absence of physical restraint,... [t]he [Due Process] Clause... provides
heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and
liberty interests," i.e., substantive due process. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
719-20 (1997) (citations omitted). "' Substantive due process' means that state action which

Candedo advances his substantive due process claim under both the federal and
state constitutions. Petr. Br. at 7 (also citing Utah Const, art, I, § 7, which similarly provides
that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law").
Candedo, however, has not argued that any different analysis or outcome would result from
the application of the state constitutional provision. Therefore, this Court should its confine
its review of Candedo's claim as provided under the federal constitution. See Bernat v.
Allphin, 2005 UT 1, 10, 106 P.3d 707 ("Because petitioners have not provided a separate
analysis of the double jeopardy protections afforded under our state constitution, we limit our
review to examining the constitutionality of Utah's justice court system under federal law.")
(citing State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 873 n. 6 (Utah 1993)), cert, denied, 545 U.S. 1104
(2005). Further, this Court has stated that "[tjhere is nothing in Utah's Constitution that
suggests that it provides greater due process protection than the United States Constitution..
.." ^State v. Orr, 2005 UT 92, 25 n.7,127 P.3d 1213 (noting the virtually identical language
of the due process provisions of the two constitutions). But see State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT
49, Tffi 33-38, 162 P.3d 1106 (asserting preference for primacy approach in cases involving
constitutional analysis).
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deprives a person of life, liberty or property must have a rational basis, that is to say, the
reason for the deprivation may not be so inadequate that the judiciary will characterize it as
'arbitrary.'" LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1443 (3rd ed. 2000)
(citations omitted).
The "established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary
features: First, [the Court has] regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially
protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition,"... and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that
"neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed" . . . Id. at 720-21 (citation
omitted). "Second, [the Court has] required in substantive-due-process cases a "careful
description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.. . "Id. at 721 (citation omitted).
"Fundamental rights are 'those rights which form an implicit part of the life of a free
society.9" Tindley v. Salt lake City School District, 2005 UT 30, 29, 116 P.3d 295 (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).

Due process "forbids the government to infringe . . .

'fundamental' liberty interests . . . , no matter what process is provided, unless the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292, (1993). See also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998) ("Socalled 'substantive due process' prevents the government from engaging in conduct that
'shocks the conscience,' . . . or interferes with rights 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.' ") (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)).
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"[I]n addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights," the Supreme
Court has specified only a limited number of fundamental rights and liberties that are
"specially protected by the Due Process Clause." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. At this
point, the Court has identified only the following additional fundamental rights: the right to
marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one's children, to marital
privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion; it has also acknowledged
the Court's likely inclusion of the right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment. Id.
(citations omitted). The paucity of that unique list reflects the Court's parsimonious
approach to concluding that any asserted liberty interest qualifies as "fundamental":
But we "ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due
process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered
area are scarce and open-ended."... By extending constitutional protection to
an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter
outside the arena of public debate and legislative action. We must therefore
"exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this
field," . . . lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly
transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court[.]
Id. at 720 (citations omitted).
If the asserted liberty interest is not fundamental, the challenged infringement need
only be "rationally connected to a governmental interest." Flores, 507 U.S. at 303. See also
Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 580 (Utah 1993) ("Under the rational-basis, or least restrictive
standard, a statutory classification is constitutional unless it has no rational relationship to a
legislatively stated purpose or, if not stated, to any reasonably conceivable legislative
purpose.") And further, assessment of a challenged statutory provision under the rational
relationship test does not include any weighing of the challenged state action against the
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asserted interest.

See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722 (u[B]y establishing a threshold

requirement—that a challenged state action implicate a fundamental right—before requiring
more than a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest to justify the action, [the Court's
substantive due process jurisprudence] avoids the need for complex balancing of competing
interests in every case.")
"A presumption of constitutionality is extended to statutes . . . . " Lee v. Gaufin, 867
P.2d 572, 580 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted). "Moreover, the presumption requires a court
to presume that the classification was intended to further the legislative purpose." Id. "The
burden is upon the defendant to show that he has been denied his constitutional rights."
State v. Spiers, 12 Utah 2d 14, 17, 361 P.2d 509, 511 (1961).
2. Candedo's asserted liberty interest—the right to have his
probation terminated after the period of his prospective
rehabilitation has passed—is no right at all.
Candedo fails to articulate a basis for any substantive due process analysis. He asserts
that section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) violates substantive due process because it does not rationally
further the Legislature's stated legitimate interest in rehabilitating offenders and that he has
the right to have probation terminated after the period of his prospective rehabilitation has
passed. Petr. Br. at 9-31. This claim fails because, as Candedo concedes, see Petr. Br. at 28,
he has "no constitutional right to be placed on probation . . . . " Beal v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d
418,421,454 P.2d 624, 626 (Utah 1969); State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198,205, 310 P.2d 388,
393. See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1(10) (West 2004) ('"Probation' is an act of grace
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by the court . . . . " ) If an offender does not have the right to be put on probation, he a
fortiorari does not have the right to a specific length of probation.
This Court has twice applied the foregoing reasoning in holding that that a probationer
may be burdened as a condition of probation to the same extent that he might be burdened
by imprisonment. In Orr, the Court recognized that although Orr was entitled to "minimum
[procedural] requirements of due process" in probation extension proceedings, he could still
legally have his probation extended or revoked for a non-willful failure to pay restitution "if
alternative measures [were] not adequate to meet the State's interests in punishment and
deterrence[.]" 2005 UT 92, ffif 16, 34. Orr, 2005 UT 92, This Court noted that while
revocation of probation implicated a "grievous loss of liberty," extension involved "a mere
continuation of probationary restrictions and the 'possibility of future revocation.'" Id. at *J|
13 (citation omitted). Similarly, In re A.CC, 2002 UT 22, fflf 1, 27, 44 P.3d 708, in
upholding a suspicionless search as a condition of probation, the Court noted that instead of
probation, the juvenile court could have placed A.CC. in secure confinement, where his
freedom would have been severely restricted. Id. at | 25. The Court further stated that
"since the juvenile court was authorized to completely restrict A.C.C.'s right to privacy and
such a decision would have been deemed constitutional, its decision to place him on
probation subject to a condition that his belongings could be searched randomly should also
be permitted." Id. at ^f 26. Thus, in both Orr and A. C C., this Court recognized that it was
not an infringement of constitutional rights to burden a probationer in any way that he might
also be burdened by imposing the legitimate alternative of imprisonment.
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The same is true here. Because Candedo could have been imprisoned for fifteen
years, he has no right to challenge a probationary term that might last nine years.4 Stated
differently, because Candedo has shown no right to a limited term of probation, substantive
due process is not violated by Utah's probation statute, which permits probation as long as
necessary and permits probation to be terminated whenever warranted.
In sum, the Court should not even entertain Candedo's substantive due process claim.
But even applying substantive due process analysis, Candedo's claim fails. The asserted
liberty interest is not "fundamental," and the probation statute is rationally related to the
legitimate state interest in protecting the community by ensuring the payment of restitution
and in rehabilitating the offender.
3. Candedo's asserted liberty interest—the right to have his
probation terminated after the period of his prospective
rehabilitation has passed—is not so "deeply rooted in this nation's
history and tradition/' so "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty," or its infringement so "shocking to the conscience," as to
be considered "fundamental."
As stated, '"[s]ubstantive due process' analysis must begin with a careful description
of the asserted right, for '[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the
utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.'" Flores, 507 U.S. at
302. Candedo's "'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest... is . . .
'the "liberty" specially protected by the Due Process clause [which] includes' the right of a
person who has been selected as a young or unhardened offender likely to succeed on

4

Candedo was sentenced to a single one-to-fifteen-year suspended prison term and
two zero-to-five-year suspended prison terms, to be served concurrently. R245
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probation to regain his liberty once the purposes of probation are complete." Petr. Br. at 2627 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S, at 720-21, 723). Stated more directly, the fundamental
right Candedo advances is the right of a probationer to have his probation terminated once he
has passed the point at which he might be rehabilitated.
That asserted right is hardly "fundamental." Simple comparison with those few rights
the Supreme Court has identified as "fundamental" shows that. Those fundamental rights
embrace only those expressly stated in the Bill of Rights and the very most intimate
relationships in human existence. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (identifying, for example,
the right to marry, to have children, to bodily integrity, etc.). Candedo's asserted right, by
contrast, consists only of the freedom to be released from AP&P's administrative scrutiny if
he might be rehabilitated within five years, the maximum period Candedo claims necessary
for rehabilitation for anyone. Petr. Br. at 16. Such a conditional liberty interest, if it exists at
all, cannot be a fundamental interest. And, by definition, conditional and fundamental
interests are virtual opposites. See Webster's New World Dictionary (Coll. ed. 1957)
(defining "fundamental" as "basic," "essential"; whereas "conditional" means "qualified,"
"not absolute").
Moreover, the asserted liberty right, at best dependent on the existence of a statutory
provision authorizing probation, is not "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21. Compare Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711-16 (tracing back
over 700 years tradition of legal prohibition of suicide and assisted suicide in AngloAmerican common law and code in upholding ban against physician-assisted suicide) with
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Mass. Acts 1878, ch. 198 (authorizing the "placing on probation of such persons as may
reasonably be expected to be reformed without punishment") (cited in The Attorney
General's Survey of Release Procedures 15 (1939) as "what may be considered the first
probation statute") (emphasis added). Further, in holding that the state's ban on assisted
suicide did not implicate a fundamental liberty right, Glucksberg, noted that almost every
state had made it a crime to assist a suicide. 521 U.S. at 710.
Candedo can make no such equivalent showing. He lists a large number of states
have enacted statutes that have limited probation to not more than five years to support his
uncertain claim that such enactments reflect acceptance of the notion that the period of
effective rehabilitation should not extend more than five years. Petr. Br. at 15-16 n.3. But a
large number of states, in apparent denigration of that notion, have deferred discretion to the
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courts to impose probation without limit, or as limited either by the maximum term of the
offense or to a term far in excess of five years.5 Supra n.5.
Nor can the asserted liberty interest be considered "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. As discussed below, Candedo greatly overstates that the
5

See Ark. Code. Ann. § 5-4-306 (a)(1) (2008) (definite probationary period not to
exceed maximum jail time or prison sentence allowable for the offense charged); Cal. Penal
Code § 1203.1(a) (2008) (period not to exceed maximum jail time or prison sentence
allowable for the offense charged); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-1.3-202(1) (2008) (probation
within court's discretion, but term may not exceed maximum prison sentence); Del. Code.
Ann. tit. 11, § 4333 (b), -(d) (3) (2008) (limiting probationary term to two years for felonies,
but permitting imposition of "a longer period . . . to ensure the collection of any restitution
ordered"); Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2601(7) (2008) (court may "place the defendant on
probation under such terms and conditions as it deems necessary and expedient," but period
not to exceed maximum jail time or prison sentence allowable for the offense charged); Ind.
Code Ann. § 35-38-2-3 (i)(l) (2008) (period not to exceed maximum jail time or prison
sentence allowable for the offense charged); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4611 (c)(6) (2008) (for
crimes committed on or after July 1, 1993, "not to exceed 60 months, or the maximum
period of the prison sentence that could be imposed whichever is longer"); Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann., ch. 279, § 1A (2008) (length and conditions of term left to the discretion of the court);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 991a (A)(1), -E (2008) (not to exceed two years, except that term
may be extended not to exceed maximum of term or terms of sentence); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 137.545(l)(a) (2008) ("period of probation shall be as the court determines and may, in the
discretion of the court, be continued or extended"); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9722 (2008);
see Commonwealth v. Duff, 200 A.2d 773 (Pa. 1964) (probation may be fixed period of time,
not to exceed the maximum period of imprisonment); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-13 (2008)
("period of probation shall not exceed the longest sentence which the court may impose");
Tenn. Code Ann. §40-35-303(c)(l) (2008) (probation period miist fall within minimum and
maximum sentence allowed for the class of the conviction); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
42.12(3)(b) (2008) (not more than ten years for a second degree felony—punishable from
two to twenty years under art. 12.33); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) (2008) (discretion
to the court to determine length of probation); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 205(a)(1) (2008)
(discretion to determine length of probation; nonviolent felonies not to exceed statutory
maximum term of imprisonment, unless interests of justice indicates a longer term); Va.
Code Ann. § 19.2-303 (2008) (court has discretion to determine length of probation; statute
provides no express limitation).
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purpose of probation is the rehabilitation of the offender. Petr. Br. at 9. As discussed below,
American jurisprudence uniformly recognizes other purposes of probation, including the
protection of the public, generally, and victims, particularly. Thus, Candedo's asserted
fundamental right exists only to the extent that other legitimate probationary purposes are
entirely dismissed. In light of other probationary purposes to be served—like' victim
restitution as in this case—"justice and liberty would [not cease to] exist if [Candedo's
asserted fundamental interest] were sacrificed." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
Further, because the prospect of a probationer's rehabilitation is uncertain, as
evidenced by intransigent rates of recidivism nationwide, Candedo's alleged liberty interest
that might follow—"the right . . . to regain [] liberty once the purposes of probation are
complete (Petr. Br. at 26-27)"—can be only an expectancy.6 See United States v. Ortiz, 733
F.2d 1416, 1417-18 (10th Cir. 1984) (loss of liberty in probation extension proceeding is
"merely potential at the time of the extension"). Cf Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska
Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11 (1979) ("That the state holds out the
possibility of parole provides no more than a mere hope that the benefit will be obtained[,]..
. a hope which is not protected by due process.") (emphasis in original); O'Bar v. Pinion, 953
F.2d 74, 84 (4th Cir. 1991) ("[A] . . . hope about a future discretionary decision by prison

6

Cf, Glaze, L.E. & Bonczar, T.P., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole
in the United States, 2006, 2 (Dec. 2007) (presenting statistics and asserting that "the
percentage of probationers who completed their full-term sentence or were discharged early
declined, from 60% in 2000 to 57% in 2006").
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administrators—an expectation of continued prison work release—is too speculative to
create a liberty interest.").
Given the uncertainty of Candedo's rehabilitation within any fixed time period, if at
all, "justice and liberty would [not cease to] exist if [Candedo's asserted fundamental
interest] were sacrificed." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. Indeed, it is unlikely that Candedo
possesses any due process right in light of the uncertain nature of his asserted liberty interest.
See Inmates, 442 U.S. at 11; Ortiz, 733 F.2d at 1417-18; O'Bar, 953 F.2d at 84. And
certainly imposing a lengthy period of probation to allow an offender to pay restitution to his
victims, if it comes to that, hardly "shocks the conscience." Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746.
Last, while a probationer's right to "only the 'minimum requirements of [procedural]
due process'" in extension and revocation proceedings is now well established, see Orr,
2005 UT 92, 12,16 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,786 (1973)), Candedo does
not cite any authority to support that his asserted liberty interest may be the subject of a
substantive due process claim. Petr. Br. at 7-31. Indeed the only decision even touching the
subject appears to be the court of appeals' decision in this case, refusing to address the
merits. Candedo, 2008 UT App 4, \ 5. That circumstance in itself suggests not only that the
alleged liberty interest is not only not "fundamental," but also that it is not even worthy of
due process consideration.
Flores is illustrative. There, the Supreme Court observed that it was unaware that any
court had ever upheld the particular "fundamental" liberty interest asserted. 507 U.S. at 303.
"The mere novelty of such a claim," the Court stated, "is reason enough to doubt that
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'substantive due process' sustains it; the alleged right certainly cannot be considered '"so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'"" Id.
(citations omitted).7
In sum, Candedo's asserted liberty interest—the right to have his probation terminated
after he has passed the period of prospective rehabilitation—is not a "fundamental" right
entitled to substantive due process protection. Indeed, as argued, the asserted liberty interest
comprises no right at all. But even assuming that, having been placed on probation, Candedo
had a conditional liberty interest, any infringement was "rationally related to legitimate
government interests." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728.
C.

The nine-year probationary term is rationally related to a legitimate
government interest
1. Candedo's argument incorrectly makes rehabilitation the sole
object of probation.
Candedo argues that his "nine-year probationary period is not rationally related to the

legislatively-stated purpose of Utah's probation statute"—"rehabilitation." Petr. Br. at 9.
The argument mistakenly insists that the sole purpose of probation is rehabilitation, which

In Flores, an INS regulation required that only in "unusual and extraordinary
circumstances" might a detained alien juvenile, suspected of being deportable, be released to
another adult if no parent, immediate relative, or legal guardian was available. 507 U.S. at
296-97, If not released under that provision, the juvenile would be placed in an approved
facility, replete with services for the care of dependent children. Id. at 297-98. Flores
claimed that because she had a "fundamental" right to freedom from physical restraint, it was
a denial of substantive due process to detain her under the regulation. Id. at 299-300. The
Supreme Court observed that it was "unaware . . . that any court—aside from the courts
below—ha[d] ever held that a child has a constitutional right not to be placed in a decent and
humane custodial institution if there is available a responsible person unwilling to become
the child's legal guardian but willing to undertake temporary legal custody." Id. at 303.
38

will generally be achieved, if at all, within five years, as evidenced by the large number of
states that have so limited their probationary periods. Petr. Br. at 9-16, 15-16 n.3, 18.
a. Rehabilitation is not the exclusive concern of probation; the
protection of society is equally as important.
The State recognizes that rehabilitation is an important and perhaps even the primary
goal of probation. See McPhie v. Turner 10 Utah 2d 237, 239, 351 P.2d 91, 92 (1960)
("[T]he purpose [of probation] is reform and rehabilitation."); Baine v. Beckstead, 10 Utah
2d 4, 10, 347 P.2d 554, 559 (1959) (same). However, Candedo mistakenly states that "the
legislatively-stated purpose of probation in Utah is rehabilitation." Petr. Br. at 9 (emphasis
added). In support, Candedo cites Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1(10) (West 2004), which states
only that "'[probation' is an act of grace by the court suspending the imposition or
execution of a convicted offender's sentence upon prescribed conditions."
While acknowledging the significance of rehabilitation, the State has been unable to
locate any Utah statute that assigns such exclusivity to probation. Indeed, it is wellrecognized that other interests, including "the public interest" and the "protection of society,"
see State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993), as well as "rehabilitation, . . .
deterrence, punishment, restitution, and incapacitation," are considered in determining
whether to place an offender on probation. State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048,1051 (Utah. App
1991). See also 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King & Orin S. Kerr,
Criminal Procedure § 26.9(b) (3rd ed. 2007) ("In order to be valid, probation conditions must
be reasonably related to the offense involved, the rehabilitation of the defendant, the
protection of the public, or another legitimate punitive purpose."); ABA Advisory Project on
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Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and
Procedures 66 (1967) ("'[t]he [model probation] statute should authorize the court to use
probation at its discretion . . . for the best interest of the offender and society.'" (citation
omitted) (emphasis added). As discussed below, the Utah probation statute, and the
probationary term imposed in this case, not only serves the general rehabilitative interest of
probation, but also the specific interests of payment of full restitution, which also serves a
rehabilitative purpose.
b. Maximum payment of restitution to victims through a lengthy
probationary term, consistent with a probationer's rehabilitation,
is a rational goal of probation.
The entire thrust of Candedo's claim is to restrict the legitimate goal of probation to a
temporally-limited, prospective period for rehabilitation, while virtually excluding any other
legitimate goal, and thereby asserting that the imposition of any supervision beyond that
period is irrational. Petr. Br. at 9-25. Acknowledging that the trial court imposed the nineyear probationary term "'because of the amount of restitution that [he] had ; to pay back,'"
Candedo argues that "[restitution is not a legislatively-stated goal of probation in Utah," and
that " the purposes of probation and restitution are naturally at odds," because payment of
restitution may take years. Petr. Br. at 22,24. That argument flies in the face of the panoply
of Utah statutes that directly authorize the payment of restitution, both independently and as
a condition of probation.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(l)(d) (West Supp. 2008) defines "restitution," as the
"payment for pecuniary damages to the victim." The section also states that a court may
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sentence defendant to probation and that "in addition to any other sentence it may impose,
the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims," and that "[i]n
determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and
procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-201(2)(c), -(4)(a), -(b) (West Supp. 2008). Section 77-18-1 provides that
"[w]hile on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the
defendant... make restitution . . . to the . . . victims with interest in accordance with Title
77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(8)(ix) (West
Supp 2008). The Victims' Rights Act states that "the Legislature declares its intent to ensure
. . . that the rights extended in this chapter to victims . . . of crime are honored and protected
by law in a manner no less vigorous than protections afforded criminal defendants." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-37-1(1) (West 2004). That act further states that "[v]ictims may seek
restitution or reparations . . . as provided in Section[] 77-38a-302 [of the Crime Victims
Restitution Act]." Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-3(l)(e) (West Supp. 2008).
The Crime Victims Restitution Act ("Act") is directed to the mechanism of ensuring
that restitution is paid to the victim. It contemplates the imposition of long-term probation to
enable a probationer to fulfill his restitution obligation: "'Complete restitution' means
restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008). '"Court-ordered restitution' means the
restitution that the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of
the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing." Section 77-38a-302(2)(b). "In determining
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the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the court shall consider.
.. (i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will
impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant [and] (iii) the rehabilitative
effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a302(5)(c)(i), -(iii) (emphasis added). "Other conditions" reasonably suggests an extended
period of probation to accomplish a burdensome restitution obligation.
As noted by the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203 (Utah App.
1992), "provisions governing orders for both probation and restitution are scattered
throughout multiple subsections of the criminal procedure statute[,]" that restitution and
probation "are intertwined by making one a condition of the other [,]" and that sections 76-3201 and 77-18-1 are "logically intertwined." Id. at 1206-07. In short, contrary to Candedo's
assertion, the payment of restitution is an integral part of an offender's probation in Utah.
Candedo's insistence that only a limited period of probation serves the goal of
rehabilitation, see Petr. Br. at 9-16, does not persuasively exclude other rational theories for a
successful probation, at least in cases where one of the objects of probation is restitution. In
State v. Dadiego, the Maine Supreme Court upheld the imposition of consecutive terms of
probation, totaling eight years, following defendant's plea to four counts of theft by
deception. 617 A.2d 552, 553-55 (Me. 1992). The court approved the lower court's
characterization of the offenses as "'unusually serious' in terms of the duration of the
criminal conduct and the amount of money taken." Id. at 554. It stated: "Consecutive terms
of probation may, in situations such as this one, allow a greater amount of restitution to be
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paid, at the same time facilitating rehabilitation." In so stating, the court noted that
"[c]ommon sense leads us to believe, and clinical research appears to confirm, that
probationers pay their restitution obligations more diligently when under the threat of
probation revocation." Id. at 555. See also Orr, 2005 UT 92, % 36 (recognizing that the
defendant's "only incentive to continue making restitution payments is to avoid his probation
being revoked"); State v. Allmendinger 565 P.2d 1119,1121 (Utah 1977) (recognizing under
section 77-35-17, early predecessor to section 77-18-1, that "t]he court may compel a person
put on probation to . . . make restitution for damages, and it may increase or decrease the
probation term[, given] that the defendant may be placed on probation for such period of
time as the court shall determine"). Not surprisingly, several jurisdictions have expressly
provided for lengthy probationary periods to ensure payment of restitution.8
Finally, that other jurisdictions generally agree with Utah in providing for lengthy
periods of probation to ensure the payment of restitution is noteworthy. As stated, many

* See Kan. Stat.Ann. §21-4611 (c) (7) (2008) ("If the defendant is ordered to pay foil
or partial restitution, the period may be continued as long as the amount of restitution
ordered has not been paid); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 533.020(4) (2008) ("Such period, with
extensions thereof, shall not exceed five (5) years, or the time necessary to complete
restitution, whichever is longer[.]") See also State v. Oliver, 490 A.2d 242,244 (Md. 1985)
(noting that Md. Code Ann. art. 27, §641 A, authorizes district court judges to impose no
more than five years probation, "[h]owever, if the defendant consents in writing, the court
may grant probation in excess of 5 years, but only for purposes of making restitution").
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states provide for potentially lengthy periods of probation. Supra note 5. And virtually
every state makes restitution a condition of probation.9

9

The following statutes, except as otherwise provided, mandate or provide for
restitution as a condition of probation: Ala. Code § 15-22-52(7) (2008); Alaska Stat. §
12.55.100 (a)(2) (2008); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-901(A), -(G) (2008); Ark. Code. Ann. §
5-4-322 (d)(1) (2008); Cal. Penal Code § 1203.1(a)(3)-(4) (2008); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
18-1.3-204 (2008); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-30(a)(4) (2008); Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, §
4333 (d)(3) (2008); D.C. Code § 16-711 (a) (2008); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 948.03 (l)(e) (2008);
Ga. Code Ann. § 42-8-34(d)(l) (2008); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706-624(1 )(g) (2008); Idaho Code
Ann. § 19-5304(5) (2008) (restitution independent of probation); 730 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 56-3 (b)(8) (2008); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-38-2-2.3 (a)(5) (2008); Iowa Code Ann. § 910.4(1)
(2008); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4610(c)(l 1), -(d)(1) (2008); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 533.020(4)
(2008); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann art. 895.1(A)(1) (2008); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17 § 1204
(2-A)(B) (2008); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 6-221 (2008) (court may impose conditions
it considers proper); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 276, § 87A (2008) (same); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 771.3(l)(e); (2)(f) (2008); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.135(a)(1), -(c)(la)A.04
(2008); Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-47(5) (2008); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 479.190(2X1) (2008); Mont.
Code Ann, § 46-18-241(1) (2008); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2262(2)(s) (2008); Nev. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 176A.310(l)(h) (2008); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651:2(V)(g) (2008); N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2C:45-l(c) (2008); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-17-1 (2008); N.Y. Penal Law § 65.10(2)(g) (2008);
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-1343(b)(9) (2008);N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-07(4)(e) (2008);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 99 la-4.1(c)(7) (2008)(probation for payment of restitution, only
available to non-violent offenders); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2951.02(C) (2008); Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 22, § 99 la-4.1(C)(7) (2008) (Community Service Sentencing Program has option of
probation/restitution, but is only open to non-violent offenders); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
137.540(l)(a) (2008); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9721(c) (2008); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-32
(2008); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-430 (2008) (court may impose any condition, not otherwise
prohibited- restitution is not prohibited); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-27-18.3(3) (2008);
Tenn. Code Ann. §40-35-303(c)(2)(B)(ii) (2008); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.037(a)
(2008); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(8)(a)(ix) (2008); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 252(b)(6)
(2008); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-303 (2008); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.95.210(2)(b), (3)
(2008); W. Va. Code Ann. § 62-12-9(b)(l) (2008); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 973.09(l)(b) (2008);
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-40-112(c) (2008).
In addition, the following statutes note that preventing an offender from profiting
from crime and ensuring that a victim is paid restitution are compelling state interests: Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-4.1-201 (1); (2008) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15B-30 (2008); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 7.68.300 (2008); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-40-301 (2008).
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In apparent contradiction to Candedo's basic thesis, virtually all of the referenced
jurisdictions recognize rehabilitation to be a prominent goal of probation, either as provided
within the statute or by annotated case law. Supra n.5. But all nevertheless permit
probationary periods of more than five years, particularly when necessary to maximize the
payment of restitution, as in this case. See e.g., Dadiego, 617 A.2d at 555 (holding that
consecutive probation periods "allow a greater amount of restitution to be paid, at the same
time facilitating rehabilitation"); State v. Harrison, 588 N.W.2d 556, 565 (Neb. 1999)
(upholding two consecutive five-year probation terms where evidence suggested offender's
likely rehabilitation); State v. Breeden, 932 P.2d 936, 938-39 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997)
(upholding probationary term extended an additional seven years against claim of "unfair..
. penalization]," where payment of full restitution had not been made and total probationary
term was within statutory limits); Commonwealth, v. Wood, 446 A.2d 948, 950 (Pa. Super.
1982) ("The purpose of a sentence of restitution and 'the reason for its imposition, is the
rehabilitative goal it serves by impressing upon the offender the loss he has caused and his
responsibility to repair that loss as far as it is possible to do so.")
Given the widespread recognition that potentially lengthy probationary terms are not
intrinsically antithetical to rehabilitation and that the goal of ensuring that criminals pay
restitution to the victims of crime is so universally recognized, Utah's probation statute and
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the nine-year probationary term in this case are rationally related to legitimate state interests.
Accordingly, Candedo's substantive due process claim fails.
2. Candedo fails to show that Wallace misinterpreted the probation
statute.
Beneath Candedo's substantive due process claim is the effort to unravel this Court's
holding in Wallace. Candedo argues that Utah, like the other jurisdictions cited, see Petr.
Br. at 15-16 n.3, "understood the danger of long probationary periods and intended to limit
the length of probation that a trial court may impose." Petr. Br. at 19. Acknowledging this
Court's decision in Wallace— holding that the "current form" of Utah's probation statute,
"does not impose any limitation on the length of probationary term that a court may
impose"— Candedo nevertheless argues that Wallace does not reflect legislative intent. Petr.
Br. at 19-21 (quoting Wallace, 2006 UT 86, 13). The argument is mistaken.
As noted, in Wallace this Court held that "the Utah Code imposes no statutory time
limitation on probation." 2006 UT 86, *f 16. Candedo makes no persuasive argument that
Wallace misinterpreted the probation statute. Candedo asserts that "[tjhe Legislature
adopted the pre-1989 version of the probation statute in 1984 for the express purpose of
limiting the length of probation." Petr. Br. at 21 (citation omitted). Thereafter, he argues
only that "the Legislature passed the current version of the statute without any discussion,
thereby suggesting that the Legislature only intended to expand the length of probation
permitted and not to revoke its overarching policy to limit the length of probation." Id.
(citation omitted). This Court rejected that very argument in Wallace:
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Wallace argues that the Legislature intended only to extend the
prescribed time periods, leaving the mandated limitations otherwise intact.
Had that been the Legislature's intent, however, it easily could have said so by
simply increasing the specified time periods. Instead, it replaced "shall" with
"may," and in the absence of any clear legislative indication to the contrary,
we take the Legislature at its word.
Wallace, 2006 UT 86, If 12. In short, the Court's reading of the probation statute evinces a
legislative intent to authorize a probationary term of any length, consonant with the
substantial number of states that have put in place provisions comparable to Utah's probation
statute. See supra, note 5.
3. The Code does not limit the trial court's discretion to extend the
probationary period in order to enforce restitution.
"The trial court's power to grant, modify, or revoke probation is purely statutory, and
although a trial court has discretion in these matters, the court's discretion must be exercised
within the limits imposed by the legislature." Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788,791 (Utah 1990).
Looking to undercut any basis for a trial court's authority to impose a probationary term in
excess of thirty-six months, Candedo argues that the Code generally also limits probation
extensions. Petr. Br. at 22-23. In fact, the Code speaks otherwise.
Candedo concedes, as he must, that "the trial court may order the defendant to pay
restitution as a condition of probation." Petr. Br. at 22-23 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-18l(8)(a)(ix) (West Supp. 2008)). He then argues, however, that "the Code expressly forbids
the trial court from extending the probationary period in order to enforce restitution." Petr.
Br. at 23. In support, he first cites Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(ii)(A) (West Supp.
2008). That section provides: "If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period
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under Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as
defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the
defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the
account receivable."10 That section plainly places no limit on the probationary period
necessary to enforce restitution. If anything, it suggests that the Legislature contemplated
extensive probationary periods to allow payment of restitution. See Orr, 2005 UT 92, f 37
(probation extended to allow continued payment of restitution).
Candedo then relies on Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-501 (West 2004) to argue that
although the court may impose a sanction for a default in the payment of restitution, "the
'court may not impose a sanction' if 'the sanction would extend the defendant's term of
probation or parole.'" Petr. Br. at 23-24 (quoting section 77-38a-501(2)(b)). That statute,
however, does not apply to this case.
Section 77-38a-501 (1) provides for sanctions "against the defendant as provided in
section 76-3-201.1." Utah Code Ann § 76-2-201.1 (West 2004) provides for sanctions on
those owing various types of debts, including restitution. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.1 (1)
to (8). Supra, note 8. Section 77-3 8a-501(2), on which Candedo relies, states that "[t]he
court may not impose a sanction against the defendant under Subsection (1) if: (a) the
10

A "'criminal judgment accounts receivable' means any amount due the state
arising from a criminal judgment for which payment has not been received by the state
agency that is servicing the debt." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.1 (l)(a). An "'accounts
receivable' includes unpaid fees, overpayments, fines, forfeitures, surcharges, costs, interest,
penalties, restitution to victims, third party claims, claims, reimbursement of a reward, and
damages." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.1 (l)(b).
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defendant's sole default in the payment of a judgement [sic] for restitution is the failure to
pay restitution ordered under Subsection 76-3-201(6) regarding costs of incarceration in a
county correctional facility; and (b) the sanction would extend the defendant's term of
probation or parole." Subsection 76-3-201(6), however, does not apply to Candedo's
circumstances. It refers only to restitution owed to "the county for the cost of incarceration
in the county correctional facility before and after sentencing." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201
(6)(a) to (d) (West Supp. 2008).
In sum, the probation statute contains no ancillary provisions suggesting that the
Legislature intended to limit a probationary term. See Wallace, 2006 UT 86, ^f 14 ("In
addition, we find no other provision that limits the term of probation and therefore conclude
that our law currently provides no statutory limitation on the length of probation a trial court
may impose.")
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the court
of appeals' refusal to consider Candedo's due process claim under rule 22(e) or the
exceptional circumstances doctrine. If the Court concludes, however, that the court of
appeals erred, the Court should affirm Candedo's sentence, holding that the imposition of a
nine-year probationary term to pay restitution was not a violation of due process.
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

Case No. 20080183-SC

Francisco A. Candedo,
Defendant and Petitioner.
ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on March 3, 2008.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted as to the following issues.
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding Petitioner's due
process arguments could not be raised under rule 22(e) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding exceptional
circumstances did not justify treatment of Petitioner's due
process arguments on the merits.
3. Whether the imposition of a nine-year probationary term
violated Petitioner's right to due process.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon
its issuance.
For The Court;
Dated

n-i\-o(

S

Matthew B. Durrant
Associate Chief Justice
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

A m e n d m e n t XTV. Citizenship; privileges and immunities; due process;
equal protection; apportionment of representation; disqualification of
officers; public debt; enforcement
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military,
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House,
remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither
the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations
and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section S. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.

§ 7 6 - 2 - 2 0 2 . Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or for
conduct of another
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.
§ 76-3-201. Definitions—Sentences or combination of sentences allowed—
Civil penalties—Hearing
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing
court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and
medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a
victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation
and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act
(e)(i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has; suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendant's (riminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted of
an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law,
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) on or after April 27,1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(f) to death.
(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty,
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the
defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed
to make restitution as part of a plea agreement
(b) In deterniining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria
and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the
defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses *if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime,
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a
warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall
be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant
transported regardless of the number of defendants actually trans ported in a single trip.
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§ 76-3-201
may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any
governmental entity for the extradition.
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless otherwise
ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection (6)(c), the defendant shall pay restitution to the
county for the cost of incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after
sentencing if:
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the
county correctional facility, and
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility
through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under Section 64-13e-104 if the defendant is a state probationary inmate, as defined in Section
64-13e-102, or a state parole inmate, as defined in Section 64-13e-102.
(b)(i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are the amount determined by
the county correctional facility, but may not exceed the daily inmate incarceration costs and
medical and transportation costs for the county correctional facility.
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses incurred
by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation for an inmate
qualifying as an individual with a disability as denned and covered by the federal
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including medical
and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability.
(c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under this Subsection
(6) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the restitution, the court shall
consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-302 (5)(c)(i) through (iv) and shall enter the
reason for its order on the record.
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under
Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76-1-304, the county shall
reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of incarceration under
Subsection (6)(a).
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-201; Laws 1979, c. 69, § 1; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 1; Laws 1983, c 85, § 1; LawB
1983, c. 88, § 3; Laws 1984, c. 18, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 156, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 107, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 81,
§ 1; Laws 1992, c 142, § 1; Laws 1993, c 17, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 19; Laws 1995, c. Ill, § 1, eff.
May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 117, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 301, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws
1995, c. 337, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 10, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c.
40, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 79, § 98, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 241, §§ 2, 3, eff.
April 29,1996; Laws 1998, c. 149, § 1, eff. May 4,1998; Laws 1999, c. 270, § 15, eff. May 3,1999; Laws
2001, c. 209, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 4, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 280, § 1, eff.
May 5, 2003; Laws 2006, c. 208, § 1, eff. May 1, 2006; Laws 2007, c. 154, § 1, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws
2007, c. 339, § 3, eff. April 30,2007; Laws 2007, c. 353, § 9, eff. April 30,2007; Laws 2008, c. 151, § 1, eff.
May 5, 2008.

§ 76—3—201.1. Collection of criminal judgment accounts receivable
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Criminal judgment accounts receivable" means any amount due the
state arising from a criminal judgment for which payment has not been
received by the state agency that is servicing the debt.
(b)' "Accounts receivable" includes unpaid fees, overpayments, fines, forfeitures, surcharges, costs, interest, penalties, restitution to victims, third party
claims, claims, reimbursement of a reward, and damages.
(2)(a) A criminal judgment account receivable ordered by the court as a
result of prosecution for a criminal ofiFense may be collected by any means
authorized by law for the collection of a civil judgment.
(b)(i) The court may permit a defendant to pay & criminal judgment
account receivable in installments.
(ii) In the district court, if the criminal judgment account receivable is
paid in installments, the total amount due shall include all fines, surcharges, postjudgment interest, and fees.
(c) Upon default in the payment of a criminal judgment account receivable
or upon default in the payment of any installment of that receivable, the
criminal judgment account receivable may be collected as provided in this
section or Subsection 77-18-1(9) or (10), and by any means authorized by
law for the collection of a civil judgment.
(3) When a defendant defaults in the payment of a criminal judgment
account receivable or any installment of that receivable, the court, on motion of
the prosecution, victim, or upon its own motion may:
(a) order the defendant to appear and show cause why the default should
not be treated as contempt of court; or
(b) issue a warrant of arrest.
(4)(a) Unless the defendant shows that the default was not attributable to an
intentional refusal to obey the order of the court or to a failure to make a good
faith effort to make the payment, the court may find that the default constitutes
contempt.

mitted until the criminal judgment account receivable, or a specified part of
it, is paid.
(5) If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the default is not
contempt, the court may enter an order for any of the following or any
combination of the following:
(a) require the defendant to pay the criminal judgment account receivable
or a specified part of it by a date certain;
(b) restructure the payment schedule;
(c) restructure the installment amounted) except as provided in Section 77-18-8, execute the original sentence of
imprisonment;
(e) start the period of probation anew;
(f) except as limited by Subsection (6), convert the criminal judgment
account receivable or any part of it to community service;
(g) except as limited by Subsection (6), reduce or revoke the unpaid
amount of the criminal judgment account receivable; or
(h) in the district court, record the impaid balance of the criminal judgment account receivable as a civil judgment and transfer the responsibility
for collecting the judgment to the Office of State Debt Collection.
(6) In issuing an order under this section, the court may not modify the
amount of the judgment of complete restitution.
(7) Whether or not a default constitutes contempt, the court may add to the
amount owed the fees established under Subsection 63A-8-201(4)(g) and postjudgment interest.
(8)(a)(i) If a criminal judgment account receivable is past due in a case
supervised by the Department of Corrections, the judge shall determine whether or not to record the impaid balance of the account receivable as a civil
judgment.
(ii) If the judge records the unpaid balance of the account receivable as a
civil judgment, the judge shall transfer the responsibility for collecting the
judgment to the Office of State Debt Collection.
(b) If a criminal judgment account receivable in a case not supervised by
the Department of Corrections is past due, the district court may, without a
motion or hearing, record the unpaid balance of the criminal judgment
account receivable as a civil judgment and transfer the responsibility for
collecting the account receivable to the Office of State Debt Collection.
(c) If a criminal judgment account receivable in a case not supervised by
the Department of Corrections is more than 90 days past due, the district
court shall, without a motion or hearing, record the unpaid balance of the
criminal judgment account receivable as a civil judgment and transfer the
responsibility for collecting the criminal judgment account receivable to the
Office of State Debt Collection.
(9)(a) When a fine, forfeiture, surcharge, cost permitted by statute, fee, or an
order of restitution is imposed on a corporation or unincorporated association,
the person authorized to make disbursement from the assets of the corporation
or association shall pay the obligation from those assets.
(b) Failure to pay the obligation may be held to be contempt under
Subsection (3).
(10) The prosecuting attorney may collect restitution in behalf of a victim.
Laws 1979, c. 69, § 2; Laws 1983, c. 262, § 3; Laws 1987, c. 107, § 2; Laws 1999, c.
279, § 7, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2002, c. 135, § 4, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 278,
§ 1, eff. May 5, 2003.
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 3. PUNISHMENTS
PART 2. SENTENCING

Copyright © 1953, 1960-1963, 1966, 1968-1971, 1973, 1974, 1976-1978, 1981,
1982, 1984 by The Allen Smith Company; Copyright © 1986-1993 by The Michie
Company. All rights reserved.
76-3-203 Felony conviction —
sentence if firearm used.

Indeterminate term of imprisonment —

Increase of

A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than
five years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may be for
life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the representation
of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the court
shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the
person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently;
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less than
one year nor more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for
a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may
additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed
five years to run consecutively and not concurrently;
(3) In
years but
tion of a
court may
to exceed

th£ case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed five
if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the representafirearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the
additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not
five years to run consecutively and not concurrently.

(4) Any person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a felony
in which a firearm was used or involved in the accomplishment of the felony and is
convicted of another felony when a firearm was used or involved in the accomplishment of the felony shall, in addition to any other sentence imposed, be sentenced
for an indeterminate term to be not less than five nor more than ten years to^run
consecutively and not concurrently.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-203, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-203; 1976, ch. 9,
§ 1; 1977, ch. 88, § 1; 1983, ch. 88, § 5.
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§ 77-18-1. Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—Probation—Supervision—Presentence investigation—Standards—Confidentiality—Terms
and conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or extension—
Hearings—Electronic monitoring
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in
abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77, Chapter
2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of any crime or
offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and
place the defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in'
cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is
with the department
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court
is vested as ordered by the court.
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards
for all individuals referred to the department These standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to detennine what level of services
shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial
Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and comment
prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement the
supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to the
standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they consider
appropriate.

(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and
submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee,
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise
the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to conduct
presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the
department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with
department standards.
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the
defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time for
the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the department or information from other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-2Q3 describing the effect of the crime on the victim
and the victim's family.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary
damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment
of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a,
Crime Victims Restitution Act
(d) The presentence investigation report shall include:
(i) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender conducted under
Section 77-18-1.1; and
(ii) recommendations for treatment of the offender.
(e) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, are protected and are not
available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the
Judicial Council or for use by the department
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the defendant's
attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for
review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence
investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may
grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the
department If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall
make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at
the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information
the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate
sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open court on record
and in the presence of the defendant
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the
defendant
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on
probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support the defendant is legally liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any treatment program in
which the defendant is currently participating, if the program is acceptable to the court;
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail designated by the
department, after considering any recommendation by the court as to which jail the court
finds most appropriate;
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of electronic
monitoring;

(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensatory service program provided in Section 76-6-107.1;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in accordance
with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and
(b) if convicted on or after May 5,1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED
certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense if the defendant has
not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed
on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in
Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by Section
76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with Subsection
77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation and
any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection (10).
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon
completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases,
or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions.
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection
(10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined in
Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the
defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the
account receivable.
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of civil
judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt Collection,
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon its
own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why the defendant's
failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court.
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt
Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination
of supervised probation will occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of
details on outstanding accounts receivable.
(ll)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been
charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation does not
constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term
unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing,
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon thefilingof a violation report with
the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance
of an order to show cause or warrant by the court
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by
the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated the
conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that
the conditions of probation have been violated.

(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facte asserted to constitute
violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized probation shall determine
if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or
extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the
defendant a warrant for the defendant's arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to
show cause why the defendant's probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended.
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall be
served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented
by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if the defendant is
indigent
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence.
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney
shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the
court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in the defendant's own behalf,
and present evidence.
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court
may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term
commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the Division of
Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a condition
of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or
the superintendent's designee has certified to the court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment
over the defendants described in this Subsection (13).
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, are
classified protected in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and
Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63G-2-403 and 63Gr-2-404, the State Records
Committee may not order the disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for
disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the
presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63G-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the department
for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the subject's
authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence investigation report
or the victim's authorized representative, provided that the disclosure to the victim shall
include only information relating to statements or materials provided by the victim, to the
circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the
crime on the victim or the victim's household.
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation under the
supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5.

§ 77-18-1
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement,
including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to the department in accordance
with Subsection (16).
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may order the
defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring as
described in this section until further order of the court.
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law
enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require:
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the defendant's
compliance with the court's order may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through electronic
monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of
Corrections; •
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the defendant
and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the
department or the program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the court
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section either
directly or by contract with a private provider.
Laws 1980, e. 15, § 2; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 2; Laws 1982, c. 9, § 1; Laws 1983, e. 47, § 1; Laws 1983, c
68, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 85, § 2; Laws 1984, c. 20, § 1; Laws 1985, c. 212, § 17; Laws 1985, c 229, § 1;
Laws 1987, e. 114, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 226, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 134, § 2; Laws 1991, c. 66, § 5; Laws 1991,
c. 206, § 6; Laws 1992, c. 14, § 3; Laws 1993, c. 82, § 7; Laws 1993, c. 220, § 3; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 24;
Laws 1994, c. 198, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 230, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 20, § 146, eff. May 1,1995; Laws 1995, c
117, § 2, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 184, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 301, § 3, eff. May 1,
1995; Laws 1995, c. 337, § 11, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 352, § 6, eff. May 1,1995; Laws 1996, c.
79, § 103, eff. April 29,1996; Laws 1997, c. 390, § 2, eff. May 5,1997; Laws 1998, c. 94, § 10, eff. May 4,
1998; Laws 1999, c. 279, § 8, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c 287, § 7, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2001, c
137, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 7, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2002, 5th Sp.Sess., c. 8, § 137,
eff. Sept 8, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 290, § 3, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2005,1st Sp.Sess., e. 14, § 3, eff. July 1,
2005; Laws 2007, c. 218, § 3, eff. July 1, 2007; Laws 2008, c 3, § 252, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c.
382, § 2193, eff. May 5, 2008.

§ 7 7 - 2 7 - 1 . Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Board" means the Board of Pardons and Parole.
(2) "Commission" means the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice.
(3) "Commutation" is the change from a greater to a lesser punishment after
conviction.
(4) "Department" means the Department of Corrections.
(5) "Expiration" occurs when the maximum sentence has run.
(6) "Family" means persons related to the victim as a spouse, child, sibling,
parent, or grandparent, or the victim's legal guardian.
(7) "Panel" means members of the board assigned by the chairperson to a
particular case.
(8) "Pardon" is an act of grace by an appropriate authority exempting a
person from punishment for a crime.
(9) "Parole" is a release from imprisonment on prescribed conditions which,
if satisfactorily performed by the parolee, enables the parolee to obtain a
termination of his sentence.
(10) "Probation" is an act of grace by the court suspending the imposition or
execution of a convicted offender's sentence upon prescribed conditions.
(11) "Reprieve or respite" is the temporary suspension of the execution of
the sentence.
(12) "Termination" is the act of an appropriate authority discharging from
parole or concluding the sentence of imprisonment prior to the expiration of
the sentence.
(13) "Victim" means:
(a) a person against whom the defendant committed a felony or class A
misdemeanor offense, and regarding which offense a hearing is held under
this chapter; or
(b) the victim's family, if the victim is deceased as a result of the offense for
which a hearing is held under this chapter.
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1985, c. 198, § 6; Laws 1988, c. 172, § 1; Laws 1990, c.
195, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 31; Laws 1996, c. 100, § 3, eff. April 29, 1996.

§ 7 7 - 3 7 - 1 . Legislative intent
(1) The Legislature recognizes the duty of victims and witnesses of crime to
fully and voluntarily cooperate with law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies, the essential nature of citizen cooperation to state and local law enforcement efforts, and the general effectiveness and well-being of the criminal justice
system of this state. In this chapter, the Legislature declares its intent to
ensure that all victims and witnesses of crime are treated with dignity, respect,
courtesy, and sensitivity, and that the rights extended in this chapter to victims
and witnesses of crime are honored and protected by law in a manner no less
vigorous than protections afforded criminal defendants.
(2) The Legislature finds it is necessary to provide child victims and child
witnesses with additional consideration and different treatment than that usually afforded to adults. The treatment should ensure that children's participation
in the criminal justice process be conducted in the most effective and least
traumatic, intrusive, or intimidating manner.
Laws 1987, c. 194, § 1.
Codifications C. 1953, § 64A-1-1.

§ 77-37-3. Bill of Rights
(1) The bill of rights for victims and witnesses is:
(a) Victims and witnesses have a right to be informed as to the level of protection from
intimidation and harm available to them, and from what sources, as they participate in
criminal justice proceedings as designated by Section 76-8-508, regarding witness tampering, and Section 76-8-509, regarding threats against a victim. Law enforcement, prosecution, and corrections personnel have the duty to timely provide this information in a form
which is useful to the victim.
(b) Victims and witnesses, including children and their guardians, have a right to be
informed and assisted as to their role in the criminal justice process. All criminal justice
agencies have the duty to provide this information and assistance.
(c) Victims and witnesses have a right to clear explanations regarding relevant legal
proceedings; these explanations shall be appropriate to the age of child victims and
witnesses. All criminal justice agencies have the duty to provide these explanations.
(d) Victims and witnesses should have a secure waiting area that does not require them
to be in close proximity to defendants or the family and friends of defendants. Agencies
controlling facilities shall, whenever possible, provide this area.
(e) Victims may seek restitution or reparations, including medical costs, as provided in
Title 63M, Chapter 7, Criminal Justice and Substance Abuse, and Sections 62A-7-109.5,
77-38a-302, and 77-27-6. State and local government agencies that serve victims have the
duty to have a functional knowledge of the procedures established by the Crime Victim
Reparations Board and to inform victims of these procedures.
(f) Victims and witnesses have a right to have any personal property returned as
provided in Sections 77-24-1 through 77-24-5. Criminal justice agencies shall expeditiously
return the property when it is no longer needed for court law enforcement or prosecution
purposes.
(g) Victims and witnesses have the right to reasonable employer' intercession services,
including pursuing employer cooperation in mmimizing employees' loss of pay and other
benefits resulting from their participation in the criminal justice process. Officers of the
court shall provide these services and shall consider victims' and witnesses' schedules so
that activities which conflict can be avoided. Where conflicts cannot be avoided, the victim
may request that the responsible agency intercede with employers or other parties.
(h) Victims and witnesses, particularly children, should have a speedy disposition of the
entire criminal justice process. All involved public agencies shall establish policies and
procedures to encourage speedy disposition of criminal cases.
(i) Victims and witnesses have the right to timely notice of judicial proceedings they are
to attend and timely notice of cancellation of any proceedings. Criminal justice agencies
have the duty to provide these notifications. Defense counsel and others have the duty to
provide timely notice to prosecution of any continuances or other changes that may be
required.
(j) Victims of sexual offenses have a right to be informed of their right to request
voluntary testing for themselves for HIV infection as provided in Section 76-5-503 and to
request mandatory testing of the convicted sexual offender for HIV infection as provided in
Section 76-6-502. The law enforcement office where the sexual offense is reported shall
have the responsibility to inform victims of this right
(2) Informational rights of the victim under this chapter are based upon the victim
providing the victim's current address and telephone number to the criminal justice agencies
involved in the case.
Laws 1987, c. 194, § 3; Laws 1988, c. 1, § 400; Laws 1993, c. 40, § 7; Laws 2000, c. 1, § 124, eff. May 1,
2000; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 12, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2005, ,c. 13, § 29, eff. March 1, 2005; Laws 2008, c.
339, § 28, eff. July 1, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2205, eff. May 5, 2008.
Codifications C. 1953, § 64A-1-3.

§ 77-38a-302. Restitution criteria
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the
defendant make restitution to victims of crime ^is provided in this chapter, or for conduct for
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For
purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and
in determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and
procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5).
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and courtordered restitution.
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all
losses caused by the defendant.
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing
or within one year after sentencing.
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in
Subsection (5).
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part,
the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record.
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the
, court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include
any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the
defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an element a
scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by
the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the
court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or
destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating
to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in
accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation;
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in
bodily injury to a victim;
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due to
theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the victim
and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the offense; and
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the
death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution,
the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution
will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other
conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the
method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution inappropriate.
(d)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine complete
restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at the time of
sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing.
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one
year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole,
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer an
order of judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of restitution.
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 8, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 13, eft May 6, 2002; Laws 2002, c. 185,
§ 51, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 285, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, c. 96, § 5, eff. May 2, 2005.

§ 7 7 - 3 8 a - 5 0 1 . Default and sanctions
<1) When a defendant defaults in the payment of a judgment for restitution or
any installment ordered, the court, on motion of the prosecutor, parole or
probation agent, victim, or on its own motion may impose sanctions against the
defendant as provided in Section 76-3-201.1.
(2) The court may not impose a sanction against the defendant under
Subsection (1) if:
(a) the defendant's sole default in the payment of a judgement for restitution is the failure to pay restitution ordered under Subsection 76-3-201(6)
regarding costs of incarceration in a county correctional facility; and
(b) the sanction would extend the defendant's term of probation or parole.
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 13, efif. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 14, eff. May 6, 2002;
Laws 2003, c. 280, § 3, eff. May 5, 2003.
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McHUGH, Judge:
fl
Francisco A. Candedo appeals his conviction for one count
each of Securities Fraud, a second degree felony, see Utah Code
Ann. §§ 61-1-1, -21 (2006), and Sales by an Unlicensed Agent and
Employing an Unlicensed Agent, both third degree felonies, see
id. §§ 61-1-3, -21 (2006).* Candedo argues that this court
should reverse because either (1) the trial court may not impose
consecutive terms of probation under the Utah Code of Criminal
Procedure, see Utah Code Arm. § 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) (Supp. 2007),
or (2) section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i), as interpreted by State v.

1. Candedo was charged under the current version of the statute.
The Utah Legislature last amended the applicable sections in
1983, see Utah Uniform Securities Act Amendment, ch. 284, sec. 4,
§ 61-1-1, 1983 Utah Laws 1108, 1114 (codified as amended at Utah
Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (2006)); 1997, see Uniform Securities Act
Amendments, ch. 160, sec. 1, § 61-1-3, 1997 Utah Laws 522, 522-23
(codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (2006)); and
2001, see Penalty for Misuse of Securities, ch. 149, sec. 1,
§ 61-1-21, 2001 Utah Laws 753, 753 (codified as amended at Utah
Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (2006)).

Wallace, 2006 UT 86, 150 P.3d 540, violates substantive due
process under the Utah and U.S. constitutions. We affirm.
1(2
First, Candedo asserts that the trial court exceeded its
statutory authority by sentencing him to 108 months of probation.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i). A trial court f s
sentencing decision, including whether to grant or deny
probation, is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
See State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, f 14, 82 P.3d 1167,
"An abuse of discretion results when the judge fails to consider
all legally relevant factors or if the sentence imposed is
clearly excessive." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
sentencing statute at issue here states that "[p] robation may be
terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon
completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or
class A misdemeanor cases."2 Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) .
After reviewing section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) in Wallace, the Utah
Supreme Court held that "our law currently provides no statutory
limitation on the length of probation a trial court may impose."
2006 UT 86, f 14 (emphasis added).
%3
Candedo argues that the Utah statute does not give a trial
court the authority to impose consecutive terms of probation, an
issue raised but not addressed in Wallace. See id. ^ 4.
However, this characterization of Candedo1s sentence does not
accurately reflect the trial court's probation order. In the
sentencing order, the Order of Probation section specifies that
"[t]he defendant is placed on probation for 108 month(s)";
nowhere does that section use the term "consecutive."3 See State
v. Penney, 776 P.2d 91, 92-93 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("Where the
language of a judgment is clear and unambiguous, it must be given
effect as it is written. . . . Although, the judge may have
intended the terms to run consecutively, we do not examine his

2. In 1989, section 77-18-1 was amended--notably, "shall" became
"may"--as discussed in State v, Wallace. See 2006 UT 86, ffl 1011, 150 P.3d 540; see also Probation Amendments, ch. 226, sec. 1,
§ 77-18-1(7)(a), 1989 Utah Laws 689, 690 (codified as amended at
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) (Supp. 2007)). Candedo was
sentenced under the current version of the statute.
3. Although the Probation Conditions section states that
"Defendant is sentenced to 36 months on each count," only the
Sentence Prison Concurrent/Consecutive Note section uses the term
"consecutive"; this note section also states that Defendant's
"[p]rison terms are concurrent with each other." In contrast,
the Order of Probation states merely that Candedo "is placed on
probation for 108 month(s)."
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intent where the written order is unequivocal." (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted)).
1J4
Even assuming that the juxtaposition of the Order of
Probation section and Probation Conditions section rendered this
order equivocal, Wallace indicates that imposing thirty-six
months for each count would nevertheless be within the trial
court's authority:
We granted certiorari on two issues: whether
section 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) creates a thirtysix-month limitation for a term of probation
as to any felony conviction; and whether
terms of probation for multiple convictions
may be imposed consecutively. Because we
conclude that the Legislature has not limited
terms of probation to any particular time
period, we need not and do not reach the
second issue.
2006 UT 86, f 4 (emphasis added). Wallace holds that there is
"no statutory time limitation on probation." Id. f 16. Because
a trial court is not time limited in its authority to impose
probation, see id. f 14, the 108-month sentence is not "clearly
excessive." See Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, H 14.
Consequently, as in Wallace, we need not consider whether-assuming such a limitation did exist--the trial court could
circumvent that limit by ordering consecutive probation periods
where multiple crimes were committed. We hold that the trial
court did not exceed its discretion in sentencing Candedo to 108
months of probation.
1[5
Second, Candedo argues that the probation statute, as
interpreted by Wallace, violates his due process rights under the
Utah and U.S. constitutions. Candedo concedes that he did not
properly preserve his due process argument in the trial court.
However, he asserts that he can still appeal this issue under
rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, or,
alternatively, under the exceptional circumstances doctrine. We
disagree with both of these contentions.
H6
Under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, an
appellate court "may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. P.
22(e). However, rule 22(e) only applies to a " f patently f " or
11
'manifestly' illegal sentence," State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App
9, K 15, 84 P.3d 854 (quoting State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860
(Utah 1990); State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, U 5, 48 P.3d 228),
which the Utah Supreme Court has defined as occurring where
either "the sentencing court has no jurisdiction, or . . . the
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sentence is beyond the authorized statutory range." Id. (citing
Telford, 2002 UT 51, 1 5 n.l). Here, there is no dispute that
the trial court had jurisdiction. Furthermore, in light of the
supreme court's statutory interpretation of section 77-181(10)(a)(i) and its holding that a "twelve-year probation does
not constitute an illegal sentence," State v. Wallace, 2006 UT
86, f 16, 150 P.3d 540, Candedofs nine-year probation is not an
illegal sentence. Therefore, Candedofs claim that his sentence
violates his due process rights is not reviewable under rule
22(e) .
f7
Alternatively, Candedo argues that this court can review his
constitutional claim, despite his failure to raise it in the
trial court, under the exceptional circumstances doctrine. "The
exceptional circumstances concept serves as a 'safety device,1 to
assure that 'manifest injustice does not result from the failure
to consider an issue on appeal. 1 " State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting State v. Ar chatnbeau, 820 P.2d 920,
923 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)); see also State v. NeIson-Waggoner,
2004 UT 29, f 23, 94 P.3d 186 ("[The exceptional circumstances
doctrine is] reserv[ed] . . . for the most unusual circumstances
where our failure to consider an issue that was not properly
preserved for appeal would have resulted in manifest
injustice."). It is "used sparingly, properly reserved for truly
exceptional situations, for cases . . . involving 'rare
procedural anomalies.'" Irwin, 924 P.2d at 11 (quoting State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n.3 (Utah 1993)); see, e.g.. In re
T.M., 2003 UT App 191, f 16, 73 P.3d 959 (determining that an
"amendment [to the termination statute] was 'a change in law or
the settled interpretation of law 1 " and therefore "the
exceptional circumstances exception applie[d]" (emphasis added)).
Candedo argues that, because the Utah Supreme Court had not yet
held that trial courts could impose unlimited probationary
terms,4 he "'had no particular need to' argue* the probation
statute violated substantive due process." (Quoting Irwin, 924
P.2d at 10.) He bases this argument on the inference from
decisions of the court of appeals, prior to Wallace, that there
were statutory limitations on probation. See State v. McDonald,
2005 UT App 86, % 21, 110 P.3d 149 ("The probationary term for a
class C misdemeanor may not exceed twelve months pursuant to Utah
Code section 77-18-1 (10) (a) ( [i])." (emphasis omitted)), cert.
4. The Utah Court of Appeals and Utah Supreme Court had not
issued their respective opinions in State v. Wallace until after
the trial court entered its order sentencing Candedo to 108
months of probation. See Wallace, 2006 UT 86 (issued Dec. 19,
2006), aff'g 2005 UT App 434, 124 P.3d 259 (issued Oct. 14,
2 005). The sentencing order at issue in this appeal is dated
September 12, 2005.
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denied, 124 P.3d 251 (Utah 2005); State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d
979, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (fl[T]he maximum formal probation
periods for . . . a class B misdemeanor [] and . . . a class A
misdemeanor[] are respectively twelve months and thirty-six
months . . . ." (citation omitted)). But see State v. Wallace,
2005 UT App 434, % 18 n.10, 124 P.3d 259 ("We are not bound by
cases which, in dicta, assume without deciding that Utah Code
section 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) creates maximum probationary
periods."), aff f d, 2006 UT 86, 150 P.3d 540. However, we do not
find this argument sufficiently compelling to satisfy the
doctrine of exceptional circumstances.
1(8
First, we fail to see how the supreme courtfs decision in
Wallace--by clarifying section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) in a way that is
detrimental to Candedo!s 22(e) claim--supports the argument that
Candedo failed to raise his constitutional claim at trial because
of the previous decisions of this court. Although Candedo might
have believed that the trial court imposed an illegal
probationary term by exceeding the statutory limits allegedly
approved in McDonald and Robinson, we do not see how the
confidence in that claim interfered with his ability to evaluate
his due process argument. See McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, % 21;
Robinson, 860 P.2d at 982. Candedo was always free to assert
both arguments in the trial court.5 Moreover, the fact that the
trial court imposed such a long period of probation--after
disagreeing with Candedofs assertion that it did not have the
authority to do so--should have put Candedo on notice that his
due process rights were arguably implicated.6

5. Additionally, Candedofs reliance on State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d
1127 (Utah 1994), is misplaced. In that case, the defendants
argument under the exceptional circumstances doctrine succeeded
because the trial court initially ruled in his favor and, at that
time, "the pretext doctrine was the controlling rule of Fourth
Amendment law as interpreted by the court of appeals." Id. at
1130, 1134 & n.2. The court also noted that "[the d]efendant had
no reason to argue that the doctrine be adopted under [the Utah
Constitution] until the State challenged the doctrine on appeal."
Id. at 1134 n.2.
6. We reiterate, however, this court's comment in State v.
Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, aff f d, 2006 UT 86: "Defendant here did
not have to accept the terms of his probation. . . . [He] did
not choose incarceration. He chose probation and thereby
accepted its terms. Having accepted its terms, he now must abide
by them." Id. f 19 (citing State v. Allmendincrer, 565 P.2d 1119,
1121 (Utah 1977)).
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f9
Furthermore, the constitutional limitations of probation
terms were not addressed in Wallace or either of the two cases
Candedo cites in support of his exceptional circumstances
argument. Even if Candedo reasonably believed that he could
later appeal the sentence under rule 22(e), he could have
asserted his due process claim as well. We will not expand the
exceptional circumstances exception to include Candedo f s
situation as it does not rise to the level of a "rare procedural
anomal [y] .fl See Irwin, 924 P. 2d at 11 (quoting Dunn, 850 P. 2d at
1209 n.3); c L State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994)
(refusing to address the defendant's due process claim on the
ground that he failed to preserve it and rejecting his argument
that exceptional circumstances existed where State v. Ramirez,
817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), decided after his trial, allegedly
would have supported his due process claim); see also State v.
Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993) (refusing to address the
merits of the defendant's due process claim, which was based on
Ramirez' s new constitutional requirements, because it was not
raised at trial--even though Ramirez issued cifter the defendant's
trial). See generally Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778, 780-81 (holding
that determination of "the due process reliability of eyewitness
identifications . . . . will require an in-depth appraisal of the
identification's reliability").7 We therefore hold that Candedo
did not preserve his due process argument and we do not address
it on appeal.
1fl0 The trial court did not exceed its discretion when it
sentenced Candedo to 108 months of probation. We do not address
Candedo!s substantive due process argument because he failed to
preserve it and neither rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal

7. Candedo further asserts that we should review his due process
claim despite his failure to preserve it because "the issue
involves a question of law that can be easily reviewed for the
first time on appeal; judicial efficiency would be furthered by
reaching the issue now . . . ; and justice would be served."
However, he cites no authority for these assertions, and we
therefore do not address them. See Peterson v. Sunrider Corp.,
2002 UT 43, f 23 n.9, 48 P.3d 918 ("We decline to address [the
defendant's] claim because it has not been properly
briefed. . . .
A single, vague sentence without citation to the
record or legal authority is inadequate." (citing State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988))).
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Procedure nor the exceptional circumstances doctrine applies
under the facts of this case.
1

Affirmed.

irolynOB. McHugh, Juage/_^

112

WE CONCUR:

:ela T. Greenwood,
Pamela
Presiding Judge
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